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I.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will describe the different approaches the United States and Thailand

employ with regard

to the director's fiduciary duty

These

a close corporation.'

in

approaches embody legal standards for director's conduct and protective measures and
devices established by law and judicial rules to protect a director

economic and public policy

A
it

close corporation

provides limited

liability.'

issues.

generally a small business entity, but

is

In the

US

a close corporation

under the provisions of state corporation law.^ Each
In effect, a close corporation in the

US may

his duty

These different approaches

with honesty and in the best interest of the corporation.
reflect underlying

who performs

state

is

has

it is

favored because

organized and incorporated
its

vary from state to

own

state.

characteristics of this type of business entity are the same, states

corporation statute.

Although the basic

have diverse, special

provisions for close corporations, and these different approaches are followed to optimize
special close corporation needs."*

In order to avoid preoccupation with the

differences

corporation in the US, this thesis focuses on the Revised
Act, the model corporation law for

'A close corporation

in the

US

is

many

is

details

of a close

Model Business Corporation

Delaware General Corporation

a close corporation or a closely-held corporation according to the

Business Corporation Act (hereinafter the "
Thailand, a close corporation

states as well as

in

a limited

Model Act")

MODEL

or corporate statute of each state. In

company under THE CiViL AND COMMERCIAL CODE, BOOK

III,

TITLE XXII (hereinafter the "Commercial Code").

MF. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.10 (2d ed. 1971); For discussion about tax advantage, see H.
Henn and J. Alexander, Laws of Corporation, § 262, at 713 (3d ed. 1983). This thesis dose not
,

discuss tax advantage of the close corporations.

MF. O'Neal, 5Mpra note 2, § 3.60.
"William S. Hochstetler and Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-An
Empirical Study; Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?, 10
J.CORP.L. 849, 859(1985).

Law and Delaware

Furthermore, the American

courts" rules. ^

Law

Institute's Principles

of Corporate Governance Project and the Corporate Director's Guidebook arc good
sources for studying and understanding the corporation law in the US.
thesis also focus

on these materials

The comparative
the Civil and

also.

analysis of Thai close corporation law will be based primarily on

Commercial Code, Book

Partnerships and Companies^ which
limited
in the

law

in the

US

and those

of

US

this type

The

the Thai law

relevant to a limited

Title

XXII.

company.

A

These differences in approaches of the corporation

in Thailand will

and a limited company

Types of Contracts.

IIL Specific

similar characteristics as those of a close corporation

are differences.

The second chapter of this
in the

is

company under Thai law has

US, but there

Therefore, this

be addressed.

thesis introduces the principles

of a close corporation

Thailand as well as describes the basic characteristics

in

of business entity in broad terms.
third chapter

of the thesis describes a director's fiduciary duty in a close

corporation by introducing the reader in part
corporation affairs. Parts
close corporation in the

B

US

and

C

and a limited company
the business

the presumption of the director's duty in

US

to the role

of a director in managing the

describe the scope of the director's fiduciary duty in a

The fourth chapter describes

the approach that

A

courts under the

in Thailand, respectively.

judgment

rule, the courts' rule

making a business

common law

decision, in the

regarding

US. This

is

system have created to protect a

director in a close corporation.

The

US

^

law

fifth

chapter describes three protective measures and devices available under

for a director to use for protecting himself in serving as a director in a close

Generally known, Delaware corporation law, both judicial and statute rules play dominant role in

changing corporation law and developing a large body of judicial rules and precedent

"The Civil and Commercial Code Book
,

III,

in the

Title XXII was promulgated on January

provisions have been revised from time to time, following the revision of T>iE SECURITIES

Act and The Public Limited Company Act,

US.

1924. Many
AND EXCHANGE

1,

but the provisions relevant to director's fiduciary duty.

corporation as well as an approach a director in limited
protect himself from performing his duty for the
Finally,

the

thesis

company

in

Thailand uses to

company.

addresses whether a director's fiduciary duty

in

a close

corporation and protective measures and devices for a director in a close corporation are
appropriate for application in the

economic environment and public

US

and

in

Because of differences

Thailand.

policy, the legal literature

is

director's fiduciary duty in a close corporation should be based

all

parties so that the duty will reflect the evolution

at that time.

This concept

is

applied in

some

states,

conflicting

in

on whether a

on contractual freedom of

of business practice and public policy
but not

all,

but

is

quite controversial.

'

II.

PRINCIPLES OF A CLOSE CORPORATION

What

A.

As

is

a Close Corporation?

close corporations, ranging from a small business (family-held corporation)

comprise the vast majority of corporations

to a big business enterprise/

States,*

in the

undoubtedly, they influence economic and public ordering.^ The state-provided

legal rules governing close corporations play a significant role in arranging

and private ordering as well as public policy of the

companies

in

question

A

state. '°

This

is

economic

true for limited

Thailand as well as in the US. Before discussing the principles of a close

corporation and a limited
initial

United

is that

company

"What

close corporation

is

is

in Part

B

and C, respectively, of

a close corporation?"

a corporation

whose

this chapter, the

'

shares, or at least voting shares, are

held by a single shareholder or closely-knit group of shareholders.'^ Generally there are

no public investors and

its

shareholders are active in the conduct of the business.'^

'HOCHSTETLER & SVEJA, supra note 4, at 859. Although most corporations have relatively few assets and
low volume of sales, size alone is not determined of whether a corporation is 'close'. Ford Motor
Company was closely held until it went public in 1995. Other large close corporations include S.C.
Johnson & Son Inc., manufacturer of Johnson's Wax, and Mars, Inc., producer of candies and food, see
IF. O'Neal, supra note 2, § 1.03.
'H. Henn & Alexander, supra note 2, § 257, at 695 (3d ed. 1983).
'Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr. and Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business
ASSOCIATIONS; CASE AND MATERIALS, at 175-177 (2d ed. 1996).
'°M
"In this part, the thesis treats a close corporation and limited company synonymous.
'^Black's
''Id.

Law Dictionary,

(6th ed. I98I-1991).

Although,
corporation,

it

been defined

is

this

definition

also

describes

not universally accepted.'''

in different

The

the Massachusetts

by: (1) a small

and

of a close

characteristics

definition of a close corporation has

ways, for example:

Generally, statutory definitions limit the
transfer restrictions,

special

number of shareholders,

and prohibit public trading of corporation's

Supreme

shares.''

require share

For example,

Judicial Court, concluded that a close corporation is typified

number of shareholders;'^

(2)

no ready market

for the corporate shares;'^

management,

(3) substantial majority shareholder participation in the

direction,

and

operations of the corporation.'^

The American Law
whose equity

Institute defines a closely held corporation as a corporation

securities are

owned by a small number of

persons, and such securities

have no active trading market.'^

Commentators, however, have typically distinguished a close corporation from a
publicly held corporation by emphasizing the following characteristics
(a)

A close corporation has a small number of shareholders;^'

(b)

All shareholders of a close corporation are active in the

:^°

management of the

corporation;^^
(c)

'"Israels,

There are restrictions on a close corporation's shares transfer;

The Close Corporation and The Law, 33 Cornell L.Q.

satisfactory all-purpose definition

of a close corporation appears ever

Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement §
'^Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass.
'^The

10;

to

and

488, 491 (1948). (No

have been worked

Del.

Code Ann.

out.)

§ 352.

578, 586, 328 N.E. 2d 505, 511 (1980).

''Id.
''Id.

"'ALI's Principles of

Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendation, ALI-CORPGOV

§ 1.06(1994).

^°H0CHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note, 4 at 852.
^'W. Carry & M. Eisenberge, Corporations at 366 (5th ed. 1980) (a close corporation is a
corporation whose shares are held by a relatively small number of persons).
^^Legislation Note, Corporations-Definition of the Close Corporation, 6 Vand. L. Rev.
1267, 1272 (1963) (a close corporation is a corporation in which the shareholders are engaged in the
management of the corporation).
^MF. O' Neal, supra note 2, § 1.07.
1

There

(d)

The

is

no market available for a close corporation's

definitions of a close corporation described

which

characteristics of a close corporation

publicly held corporation.'**

corporation

is

It

shares.^''

above focus on the specific

differ significantly

from characteristics of a

can be drawn from these definitions that a close

These definitions

one type of corporations with special characteristics.

will raise the questions: (1)

what

is

a corporation; and (2) what

is

status in the

its

community.

A

corporation has been defined as an

or under the authority of the laws of a
a special denomination which

from

distinct

that

is

state.^^

artificial

Such

person or legal entity enacted by

entity subsist as a

is,

power and

its

membership, either

term of years, and of acting as a unit or single individuals

common

authorities conferred

The Model Act

under

by the same authority, vested with

the capacity of continuous succession, irrespective of changes in

in matters relating to the

politic

regarded in law as having a personality and existence

of several members, and which

in perpetuity or for a limited

body

purpose of the association, within the scope of the

upon such bodies by

law.'^^

defines a corporation as a corporation for profit, incorporated

under or subject to the provision of this Act.^^

Although

the

definitions

of a

characteristics of a corporation are

summarily defined as a

close

common.

legal entity^^ created

corporation

are

varied,

the

basic

Thus, a close corporation shall be

by few shareholders^" for

profit^'

under

authority of state with special characteristics of no separation of functions between

^^Id. §

1.02 (a close corporation

is

a corporation

whose shares

markets.)

"HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note
^^Black's

Law Dictionary,

4, at 853.

(6th ed. 1981-1991)

''Id.

^'MoDEL. Bus. Corp. Act § 1.40.
^'Black's Law Dictionary, (6th

ed.

^°Carry & ElSENBERGE, supra note
^'MoDEL Bus. Corp. Act § 1.40.

1981-1991)

21, at

366

are not generally traded in the securities

shareholders and management,^'share transfer restrictions," and no established market
available for

B.

it's shares.^''

A Close Corporation

In the

US

in the

a close corporation

US

is

subject to a state corporation statute

provides a set of standard form governance rules for persons wishing to
operate a close corporation in

its

jurisdiction.^'

As

described in Part

close corporation has been classified as a legal entity for profit.

by delivering

create a close corporation simply

statement that corporation

is

articles

A

One

of

which

own and

this thesis, a

shareholder can

of incorporation containing a

a statutory close corporation to the secretary of the state for

filing.''

1.

Historical

Background

For a number of years,

corporations, close corporations and publicly held

all

corporations, traditionally, had been organized and governed by the
statute."

Prior to

distinctions

World War

legislatures

II,

same corporate

and courts seldom recognized the

between a close corporation and a publicly held corporation.'* During the

past fifty years, however,

many commentators have

directed attention to the unique

needs of close corporation.'^

"Legislation Note, supra note 22,
"IF. O' Neal, supra note 2, § 1.07.
^*Id. §

1

at 1272.

.02

"O'Kelley &. Thompson, supra note

"Model Bus.

Corp.

Act

§ 2.01;

9, at

175

Del. Code. Ann.

§ 101(a) provides that "...any person, partnership,

association or corporation, singly or jointly with others,...,

"Henn & Alexander, supra note
^^Id. at

''Id.

852.

2, §

257, at 696.

may

incorporate or organize a corporation...."

8

Legislatures and courts have realized that close corporation needs are distinct

from publicly held corporation
a)

needs'*" in the

following ways:

a close corporation does not have the division between the ownership and

management/' Typically,

the shareholders of a close corporation are also the officers,

manage

thus, the shareholders expect to

the corporation through direct participant,

rather than through board of directors;'^^
b)

the shareholders in a close corporation are in frequent contact with each

Management

other."^

and privileges

rights

may have been determined

through

contractual agreement and therefore, the formalities of holding annual meeting of

shareholders and directors appear unnecessary;'*'*
c)

shareholders

the

shareholders

in

a

publicly

in

a

held

close

corporation

corporation'*^

to

are

protect

in

better

their

position

than

investment in the

corporation through the use of shareholders' agreements;"^ and
d)

deadlock'*'

held corporation/^

is

more

likely to occur in a close corporation than in a publicly

Unanimous vote requirements

increase the likelihood that the

shareholders will not be able to reach agreement on issues that affect the corporation/^

"'HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note 4, at 853. In publicly held corporations the board of directors
performs the management function, but may assign his duty to director committee or officer.
''^Miller, Illinois Close Corporation; Analysis of the New Act, 27 De. Paul. L. Rev. 587,
593(1987).
"'

I

F.

O'Neal, supra note

2, §

1

.07.

'^Covington, The Tennessee Corporation Act and Close Corporations for Profit, 43 Tenn.L.
Rev. 183, 188(1976).
"^Miller, supra note 42, at 593.

'^HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note
"'Hochstetler & SVEJDA, supra note

4, at 854.

4, at 854.

Deadlock occurs when shareholders are consistently

unable to muster sufficient support for action requiring shareholder approval, see 2F.
note 2, § 9.02.

"^Henn & Alexander, supra note 2,
"'IF. O'Neal, supra note 2, § 9.02.

§

257,

at

696.

O'NEAL, supra

Disagreement

still

exists as to

how

The

close corporation needs are best met.'"

however, have developed judicial exceptions to general corporation laws

courts,

designed primarily for publicly held corporation needs.''

Some

have

legislatures

revised general corporate statutes by creating flexible laws that better serve both
publicly held corporations and close corporations."
close

special

corporation

legislation

that

is

Other legislatures have enacted

designed

specifically

for

close

corporations."

2.

Basic Principles

The law governing

the relative rights of shareholders, directors, and officers of a

close corporation historically has been state corporation law.

That remains so

although there have been changed to meet close corporation needs.
basic principles of a close corporation in the

US, nowadays,

shall

As a

today,'''

result, the

be summarized as

follows:

A

a)

Legal Entity.

legal entity separate

b)

and

A

close corporation has traditionally been recognized as a

distinct

Shareholder.

A

from

A

shareholders."

close corporation

maximum number of shareholders

^^OTE,

its

is

is

created by a shareholder'^ Generally, a

a requirement for a close corporation.'^

Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of The Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.

L.

Rev. 700, 704(1958).

^'HOCHSTETLER &. SVEJDA, supra note

4, at 855.

''Id.

^"O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 9, at 57.
"Barbar, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willi ammette L. Rev. 371 (1981).
^*MODEL Bus. Corp. Act § 2.01; Del. Code Ann. § 101 (a). Shareholders may be an
partnership, corporation, or association.

"DEL. Code Ann. §342(1).

individual,

10

Capital. Shareholder

c)

must invest the

capital,

money,

properties, workforce or

others, to corporation in order to use for undertaking corporation affairs.

The

capital

contributed to the corporation shall be divided into portions represented by shares.*^

The stock ownership

is

among

ordinarily allocated

the participants in the corporation in

direct proportion to the capital invested."

d)

Shareholders' Agreement.

Shareholders' agreements are one of the most

flexible planning tools available to a close corporation.^"

Specifically, these agreements

allow close corporation's shareholders to depart from traditional corporate management
structure
e)

provides

and

to agree

among themselves

to

Share Transfer Restrictions.
share

transfer

corporation.^^

In

as

restrictions

manage

a

some

the business.^'
states the close corporation statute

condition

for

incorporation

of a close

Other states permit reasonable restrictions on share transfer to

designated persons, class of person, and requirement for election status."
f)

Limited Liability.

Shareholders are liable only to the extent of the capital

invested in a close corporation.^''

Any

obligations that are

assumed by a close

corporation belong solely to the corporation, not to shareholders.^^

^*Hary J. Haynsworth, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know about Drafting Documents for
Closely-Held Corporations, Special Problems of Closely Held Corporations, Q171 ALI-ABA
5, 60 (1988); MODEL Bus. Corp. Act § 6.20, Official Comment. No par value required for a
corporation, and shares subscribed before in corporation must be paid in

*°Ghinger, Shareholders'

Agreement for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for

Special Circumstances, 4 U. Balt
agreement, see

L.

id. at

Rev. 221, 212 (1975). For

HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra

*'H0CHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note
Comment; Del. Code Ann. §350.
*^Hochstetler & SVEJDA, supra note
see

full.

details discussed

about shareholder's

note 4, at 501-49.

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT

4, at

525; See also,

4, at

963; For details discussed about restrictions of share transfer,

e.g.,

§ 7.32, Official

958-967.

"Id; See also

MODEL BUS.

CORP.

ACT

§ 6.27.

"HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note 4, at 919; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22; DEL. CODE Ann.
§ 162. Shzu-eholder may become personal liable by reason of his own acts or conducts through piercing
corporate veil.

"MODEL BUS.

CORP.

ACT

§ 6.22(b).

11

Management.

g)

a close

Alternatively,

Although

directors or shareholders.^^

in the

corporation

may

be managed

by

event a director manages the corporation,

the functions of shareholder, director and officer are not usually obviously identified.
Filing Requirement.

h)

required to

file

Under

^^

state corporation law, a close corporation

is

the articles of incorporation to the Secretary of State in order to be a

legal entity.^*

A Limited Company in Thailand

C.

company,

In Thailand a limited

defined as an entity for
its shares,^'

and

restrictions

1.

A

profit,^''

limited

on

Historical

company

The Commercial Code

is

is

like a close corporation in the

US,

is

also

having a small number of shareholders,^" no market for

transfer of shares.

^^

Background

subject to the Civil and

comprised six books.^"

Commercial Code^^ of Thailand.

The provisions relevant

to a limited

^^ModelBus. Corp. Act § 7.32 (a)(1); Del. Code Ann. § 351.
"5ee generally, HOCHSTETLER & SVEJDA, supra note 4, at 849-56.
**MODEL Bus. Corp. Act § 2.03; Del. Code Ann. § 106.
^'The

Commercial Code

§ 1012.

number of shareholder has been revoked by the Civil and
(1992). Therefore, a limited company in has been no longer
limited a number of shareholders. Generally, a limited company, however, has a small number of
shareholders. On the other hand THE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY ACT B.E. 2535 (1992) requires at least

™The

provision which limited the

Commercial Code Amendment B.E. 2535

1

5 shareholders to

be incorporated as a public limited company.

"The Commercial Code

§ 11 02.

'^Id.^ 1129 and § 1130.

^^The Civil

and Commercial Code, Book III, Title XXII was promulgated on

January

1,

B.E. 2467

(1924).
'"'

BOOK I General Principles, Book II Obligations, Book III,
Book V Family, and Book VI Successions.

IV Properties,

Specific Types of Contracts,

Book

12

company have been provided
upon

in

Book

III

Specific types of Contracts,

which are based

three basic concepts," that include:
a)

from

its

Concept of Legal Personality.

A

limited

company

a legal entity separate

is

shareholders;^''

b)

Concept of Share Capital.

A

capital

of a limited company

is

divided into a

small unit with the same value called share;" and
c)

Concept of Limited

Liability.

A

shareholders of a limited

limited liability only for the capital invested by each of them into the

Although a limited company

is

a legal entity for profit,

one type of contract among investors as

company

is

distinct

is

At

private limited

the

has been classified as

in

the

US. The pre-incorporated
Besides,

who

agree to

company before

first

^^

a prerequisite for creation of a limited company. ^°

Commercial Code requires

create limited

company.

a

This special characteristic of a limited

from a close corporation

shareholders' agreement
the

well.'^

it

company have

at least

seven individual shareholders^'

filing.^'

Commercial Code was promulgated without

company and

a public limited company,

all

classification of a

limited companies are

Exchange of Thailand, known

subject to the

Commercial Code. In 1974 the

as the Stock

Exchange of Thailand, was established by the Securities Exchange of

Securities

company reveals strong influence from United Kingdom corporation law.
'^SURASAK VAJASITH, THE PRINCIPLES OF CiVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE, IN BRIEF, PARTNERSHIPS AND
Companies, at 1 1 1 (8th ed. 1997).

^^General overview of a limited

''Id.

''Id

Commercial Code

^'The
Civil

§ 1012.

and Commercial Code, Book

Provisions relevant to a limited
111,

company have been provided
XXII Partnerships and

in the

Specific Types of Contracts, Title

Companies.
*°The

Commercial Code § 1097.
may be a individual,

^'Shareholder

partnership, corporation, association, but

all

seven promoters of

company required for registration of the memorandum of association must be individuals. (Ruling
by The Regulation of the Commercial Registration Division, The Registration of
Partnerships and Companies B.E 2530 (1987), Art. 61).
limited

'^The

Commercial Code

§ 1097.

13

Thailand Act B.E. 2517(1974).

2521

B.E.

B.E. 2521

provisions relevant to

later,

the Public Limited

Companies Act

Commercial

Code

(1987) was promulgated by revising and repealing

many

was enacted.

(1987)

Amendment

Three years

a

limited

Accordingly,

company

inconsistent with the Public Limited

the

the

in

Companies

and

Civil

Commercial Code which were

Act.*"*

Then, a limited company has

been classified as a private limited company with a small number of shareholders and
restriction

on share

2.

The
a)

distinct

the

Basic Principles

basic principles of a limited

A

from
b)

transfers.

Legal Entity.
its

A

limited

company

company

in Thailand are as follows:

is

a legal entity for profit separate and

shareholders.^'*

Shareholder. Shareholders of limited company, unlike a close corporation in

US, must have

at

least

seven shareholders during the

life

time of a limited

company.
c)

Capital.

A

limited

company

is

required to have capital, money, properties,

or workforce, for undertaking the business and meeting the requirement of law.
capital contributed to the

the

company must be divided

company. The company's shares need
d)

limited

Share Transfer Restrictions.

to

No

into portion represented

have a par value.

by shares of

^^

established market available for shares of a

company. The Commercial Code permits a limited company

to restrict transfer

"The Civil and Commercial Code, Book III, Title XXII was revised again when The Revised
Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (1992) was promulgated in 1992.
^'The Commercial Code § 65 and § 1096.
^'Id. §
861
''Id.

1237

§ 1960.

(4).

The
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of

it

shares in the articles of incorporation,"^ and also allow a limited

transferring of

prohibited to

company

its

own

also

is

shares for reasonable reasons.*^

its

share or take

Further, a limited

its

to

deny

company

shares in pledge for whatever reasons."^

its

prohibited to offer

company

shares to public by the Securities and

A

is

limited

Exchange

Act 1992.
Limited Liability. Like a close corporation

e)

limited

company has no

exceeding the capital

required by law for managing the company.^'

US, each shareholder of a

invested.^''

Management. Even though a limited company

d)

is

liability

in the

As

is

a small business, a director

Code

a result, the Commercial

allows a director of a limited company to voluntarily elect for

full

liability

in his

office.''

Filing Requirement.

e)

filings,

first

filing'" in

memorandum of

1129.

^^Id. §

1330.

''/c/.

§ 1143.

^°/£/.

§

Commercial Code requires two subsequent

association filing,'Wd second the incorporation

196. Unlike, piercing corporate veil in the Corporation law in the

imposed shareholders
1144.

'Vc/. §

1101. Because a director manages the

company

in all aspect, as if

"/^. § 1097.

§1111.

US, there

is

no provision

to be personally liable for their acts or conducts.

"/c^. §

^*Id.

the

order to be a legal entity.

''/J. §

1

the

Under

he

is

the

company
company himself.

business, not shareholders, he represents the

III.

THE DIRECTOR'S FIDUCIARY DUTY

IN

A CLOSE CORPORATION

Introduction to the Role of a Director in

A.

As

described in Chapter

II,

Managing Corporation

supra, a corporation

Undoubtedly, a corporation cannot express

entity.^^

business

The question

itself.

intention?

How can

it

act

would

to ask

and conduct

its

a

corporate

governance?

its

How

a legal entity or an artificial
intention, acts,

and conduct

can a corporation express

its

business?

Obviously, some form of governance

provide

be:

is

Affairs

is

necessary for a corporation.

Shareholders?

Although

corporation's owners, the fundamental principle of corporation law

a legal entity, separate and distinct from

its

shareholders.^^

As

Who

shareholders
is

should

are

the

that a corporation is

a result, shareholders

should not automatically provide a corporate governance.^'
In the

US,

as to

form of a corporate governance the Model Act

§ 8.01

provides the

following principle as to the corporate governance in a corporation.^^

Chapter

8,

Subchapter A, Section 8.01: Requirement for and Duties of

Board of Directors.
(a) Except as provided

in section 7.32,

each corporation must have a board

of directors.
(b) All corporate

powers

and the business and
direction of,

its

be exercised by or under the authority

shall

affairs

of,

of the corporation managed under the

board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in

the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under

section 7.32.

^^See supra, text
^^See supra, text

accompanying note 26-28.
accompanying note 5 and 84.

'^In a close corporation the state corporation

this event,

law allows shareholders manage the corporation

however, shareholders must bear responsibility of directors. See

§21; Del. Code Ann. §352.
also DEL. CODE ANN. § 141.

"^^See

15

affairs, in

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT SUPP.
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the board of directors

This provision expresses that

although

The board controls

governance.''

corporate

it is

not an owner of the corporation.

must be exercised by the board of

nor state corporation

§ 8.01

meet

is

form of

activities,

management power

and individual directors are not

Nevertheless, neither the

clearly defines the board

although establishing the breadth of this role
failure to

business

Generally, director's

directors collectively,

statutes'*^'

the traditional

corporation's

the

'"'^
given general agency power to deal with outsiders.

Act

is

Model

of directors' role

clearly a precondition to legal liability for

director's fiduciary duty.'°^

The American Law
the functions and

Institute'

s'°^

Principles of Corporate Governance, '"Mescribes

powers of the board of directors

in

managing

the corporation's business

as follows:

Section 3.02. Functions and Power of the Board of Directors

Except as otherwise provided by
(a)

The board of

statute:

directors of a publicly held corporation should perform

the following functions:
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the

compensation

of,

and, where

appropriate, replace the principal senior executive;
(2)

Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business to evaluate
whether the business

(3)

Review and, where

is

being properly managed;

appropriate, approve corporation's financial

objectives and major corporate plans and actions;

'"Model Bus. Corp. Act
agreement

must adopt the

7.32,

it

'°°0'

Kelley

""Del.
'"^O'

§ 8.01, Official

that satisfied the requirement

If a corporation

board of directors as

& Thompson, supra note 9, at

Code Ann.

Kelley

traditional

Comment.

does not have a shareholder

of section 7.32 or market exist for
it

sole

its

shares as specified in section

form of governance.

Id.

181.

§ 141.

& Thompson, supra note 9, at

""Since 1979 The American

Law

Institute

319.

has funded a study of corporate governance project

"Corporate Governance Project", the Principles

and federal jurisdiction, as well

as,

set

by

this project are increasingly

the state or federal legislation, see

named

addressed by the state

Guideline to THE CORPORATE

Governance Project (1994).
"^ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance
fiinctions

§ 3.02. (1994). Although this section is set basic
and powers of the board of directors of a publicly held corporation, it can be used as basic

power of the board of any corporation including a close corporation; See also, THE
1994 Edition, 49 Bus. Law. 1247, 1249 (1994), describing the
board's oversight responsibilities, rather than management.
functions and

Corporate Director's Guidebook
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(4)

Review and, where

appropriate, approve major changes in, and

determinations of other major questions of choice respecting,
the

appropriate

and

auditing

accounting

principles

and

practices to be used in the preparation of the corporation's
financial statements;
(5)

Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or
assigned to the board under a standard of the corporation.

(b)

A

board of directors also has power

to:

and adopt corporate plans, commitments, and actions;

(1) Initiate

and

(2) Initiate

adopt

changes

in

accounting

principles

and

practices;
(3) Provide advice

and counsel

to the principal senior executives;

(4) Instruct

any committee, principal senior executive, or other

officer,

and review the action of any committee, principal

senior executive, or other officer;

(6)

Make recommendations to shareholder;
Manage the business of the corporation;

(7)

Act as

(5)

to all other corporate matters not requiring shareholder

approval.

Typically, the board of directors
activities

board.

"'^

business

makes

the basic decisions with respect to the

of the corporation and directs the officers to execute the decisions of the
Thus, a director
or

employees.'"^

to

As

have

a

is

specialized

a result, the

corporate

management and

judgment

rule,'°^ to

not expected to be involved in day-to-day operation of the

liability

skill

and

knowledge possessed by corporate

of directors for involvement

affairs will likely

in decisions regarding

be determined by application of the business

be described in Chapter IV,

infra.

In Thailand as to a corporate governance, similarly, the

provides the issue relevant to corporate governance in limited

Commercial Code,

company

§

1

144

in the following

principle:

'"^James E. Spiotto, Director and Officer Liability: Who Watches the Watchmen?, 93
PLI/CORP 361, 367 (1996); See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25; DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(c) and § 142.
The board of directors may delegate its power to committee or officer.
^'^Id. In addition to these fiinctions, in a close corporation a director usually involves in day-to-day work

because traditionally, the functions of director and officer
'''Id.

in close

corporation are not absolutely separated.

The Commercial Code, Book III, Title XXII, Chapter IV,
Every limited company shall be managed by
1144:

Part

III,

Section

the director or

directors under the control of the general meeting of the shareholders and

according to the regulations of the company.

This provision uses the terms "a director or directors" rather than "the board of
directors", because under Thai

a limited

company,

shareholders,

it

if there is

law a director may be

more than one

liable individually.""*

director appointed

constitutes the board of directors. '°^

Generally, in

by general meeting of

The board of

directors

manages

the

corporation collectively through the resolution or meeting of the board of directors. "° In

managing the corporation

the board of directors exercises

it

power independently,

of the general meeting of

although this provision provides that "...under control
shareholders...",

its

merely means that the board of directors has a duty to report

all

corporate activities done by the board of directors to the meeting of shareholders for

acknowledgment, approval or

ratification as the case

may

In sum, a director or the board of directors
authorities exercised

directors
to

is

its

power

to

compensation for his services,"^ but

is

Under due

by the corporation."'

entitled to delegate

be.

the locus of

powers and

responsibility, the board of

committee or officer."^

is

all

A director is

not entitled to share in the corporation's

residual profits like shareholders. Because a director plays a significant role in

the corporation affairs,

it

and the possibility that directors will favor personal

interest

and the possibility of excessively negligent behavior of a director

Commercial Code

'°^M

§

1159-1160.

"°M

§

1159-1164.

§

managing

needs to balance the power in which the corporation delegates to

director

'°'The

entitled

1

interests

over the corporate
in

managing

169.

'"O'Kelley &. Thompson, supra note 9, at 181.
"^The Commercial Code § 164; See also. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.25, Del. Code Ann. § 141(c).
"'Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.1 1; Del. Code Ann. § 141 (h). Under Thai law there is no provision
1

relevant to director's compensation right, but practically,

it

needs to have contract between the corporation

and director which must be approved by the meeting of shareholders.

.
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corporation business,"'' thus, the fiduciary duty has been created as a standard for a
director in performing their duties in the corporation, to be described in Part

B and C

below.

Under

his role, a director enjoys his rights, for

compensation.

On

the other hand, he

must perform

standards, and be liable for the breach of his duty and

example, the right to receive

his duty in

compliance with the

some damage occurred during

There are numerous duties a director must be concerned with.

office.

sources of duties of director

an office;
itself."^

(c)

may

imposed by special

Whatever the duty

to

be

(a) prescribed

legislative provisions; or (d)

be performed by a director,

bear a fiduciary duty to the corporation and

B.

The

In the

common

Director's Fiduciary

US, the

law of both

by the corporation law;

its

Duty

or under

its

(b) inherent in

it

is

required that a director

shareholders.

in a

Close Corporation in the

its

US

origins in English

and agency from over 200 years ago."^ This fiduciary duty

based upon the fundamental principle that the business and

managed by

In general, the

imposed by the corporation

fiduciary duty of a corporate director has

trusts

his

board of directors."^

affairs

is

of a corporation are

In carrying out their managerial roles,

however, directors are charged with fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the
corporation and to act in the best interests of

its

shareholders."^ In so doing, the director

should have basic understandings of corporation business and an numerous relevant

'

'"O'Kelley

& Thompson, supra note 9, at

1

81

"^ALI's Principle of Corporate Governance,

Comment to

§ 4.01 (1994).

'*Henry Ridge Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule,
19 Del. J. Corp. L. 971, 973 (1994).
'"Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.10; Del. Code Ann. § 141; <fee also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624
(Del. Sup. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 81 1 (Del. Sup. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d.779, 782 (Del. Sup.1981); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. Sup.1985).
'"Loft, Inc. V. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch.l938), ajfd., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Sup. 1939).
'

20

factors

which vary from one corporation

out, a director's fiduciary duty exists

to another."'^

Thus, as one commentator pointed

because the decisions that face directors of a

corporation are sufficiently complex and difficult to predict that
to specify in

how to

advance

respond

to a

is

also the

mechanism invented by

term of shareholder's contingent

With regard

feasible

legal

is

based upon an agreement,

system for

filling the

unspecified

contract.'''

to the principle

performing his managerial

would not be

wide range of future contingencies.'^" Because

the relationship between the corporation and a director

fiduciary duty

it

role,'^^ the

of the standards of fiduciary duty of a director

Model Act

§ 8.30 provides:

The Model Business Corporation Act, Chapter

8,

Subchapter C, § 8.30:

General Standards for Directors
(a)

A

director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties

as a

member of a committee;
(1) in

good

faith;

(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position

(3)

would exercise under similar circumstances; and
in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best

interest

of

the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely

on information,

opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and

other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1)

one or more officers or employees of the corporation
directors reasonably believes to be reliable

whom the

and competent

in

the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters

the

director

reasonably

believes

are

within

the

person's

professional or expert competence; or
(3) a

committee of the board of directors of which he

member

if the

director

is

not a

reasonably believes the committee

merits confidence.

—

"'The Corporate Director's Guidebook 1994 Edition, supra note 104, at 1250.
'^"Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rational for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev.
23,28(1991).
'^^Del.

Code Ann.

§ 141.

in
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A

(c)

director

is

not acting in good faith

makes

the matter in question that

if

he has knowledge concerning

reliance otherwise permitted by

subsection (b) unwarranted.

A

(d)

director

is

not liable for action taken as a director, or any failure to

take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance

with this section.

The Model Act
manner

which a director performs

in

Analyzing

sets forth the standards

this Section is helpful in

The phrase

"in

courts usually assume

good

it

faith"

means

reasonably.

sense, practical

used

no fraud, bad

legal contexts, but the

faith or self-dealing.'^''

embodies long

of

common

is

the nature and extent of responsibility will vary, depending

§ 8.30, Official
at

attributes

would exercise under similar circumstances"

to the director without the benefit

Smith, 448 A.2d

common

'^^

factors as the complexity, size, urgency,

'"Model Bus. Corp. Act

traditions of the

and focuses on the basic director

particular corporation; '^\b) decision

'^'See, e.g..

wide variety of

the need to pay attention and to act diligently and

"...in a like position

to recognize that: a)

known

in a

wisdom, and informed judgment.

The phrase

by

is

businessman" which recognizes the need for innovation,

essential to profit orientation,

upon such

understanding director's duties:

"ordinarily prudent person"

like "ordinarily prudent

used

of his decision.'"

'^^

The phrase
law

his duties, not the correctness

referred as having

The word "care" expresses

of fiduciary duty by focusing on the

873.

and location of the

activities carry

on

must be made on the basis of the information
of hindsight;'^^ and

(c) the special

background,

Comment.

—

'"Corporate Director's Guidebook 1994 Edition supra note 104, at 1252.
'^*M0DEL Bus Corp. Act § 8.30, Official Comment.
'^V(i. This means that the statute does not consider the responsibility of director by comparing with
corporation which engages in the like business.

,

other
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qualifications,

and management responsibilities of a particular director

evaluating his compliance with the standard of care.

may

be relevant in

'^"^

In complying with the standard expressed in this Section a director
rely

upon information, opinions,

reports or statements described in (b) of this Section, but

has a responsibility to keep informed of the efforts from the person

a director

still

assigned.

The standards of
That

executing.'"^"

is, if

fiduciary duty of director provided by this Section

a director performs his duties

by

is

automatically released from

with no need to consider possible applicability of the business judgment

liability

rule'^'

is self-

which meets requirements of the

standards of conduct set forth in this Section, a director

any

is entitle to

court.

Although, this Section does not define exact types of director fiduciary duty,

been long recognized

that director's fiduciary duty is

obligations; the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

been recognized by courts

'^^

composed of two

it

has

legal distinct

These two obligations have also

that a director, as quasi-trustee, should

be judged by fiduciary

duty standard of not simply good faith but prudent conduct.'" For example, the Court in
Li twin

V.

Allen^^^ addressed that:

"It

is

company—a
in action

Any

clear that a director

loyalty that

is

loyalty and allegiance to the

in conflict with its rights;

is

which

he

profit at the

may

in equity

expense of his corporation and

not for personal gain divert unto himself

and fairness belong

to his corporation.

required to use his independent judgment. In the discharge of his

duties a director must, of course, act honestly

Id.

influenced

by no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation.

the opportunities

131

is

adverse interest of a director will be subjected to a scrutiny rigid and

uncompromising. He may not

He

owes

undivided and an allegiance that

For business judgment

rule, see infra,

and

in

good

faith,

but that

is

Chapter IV.

et al. Recent Developments in Delaware Law and The Law of Other
States Regarding the Business Judgment Rules as Applied in Corporate Control Situations,
'"Gilchrist Sparks,

III,

825 PLI/CORP. 355, 357 (1993).
'"Horsey, supra note 1 16, at 974.
'"25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. 1940).

23

not enough.

He must

some degree of

also exercise

skill

and prudence and

diligence.""'

1.

By

Duty of Care

the nineteenth century, the concept that corporate directors

law fiduciary duty of care
to the directors

to their institutions

of banks and financial

owed

a

common

was recognized but was generally confined

institutions.'^^

By

the latter part of the nineteenth

century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept that a corporate director
fiduciary duty of care to his corporation and

owes a

director of industrial corporation.'^^ Initially the

its

shareholders had extended to a

Supreme Court

Briggs

v.

Spaulding^^^

stated that directors should be held to the action of "ordinarily prudent

and diligent

men".'^'' Thereafter, the courts

in

commonly defined

in

the standard of duty of care of director

terms of the conduct of "a reasonable and prudent person",'"" and also refer to "duty of

care".'"'

However, the Model Act

in providing the standard

§ 8.31

does not use the exact phrase of "duty of care"

of conduct of director.

In addition to the requirements provided by law with regarding to duty of care, the

courts have ruled additional principles in determining director's responsibility for duty of
care:

The

a)

director need to be informed one.'"^

Van Gorkom^*^ addressed

For example, the Court in Smith

v.

that:

''Md. At 677-78.

'^^HORSEY, supra note

1

16, at 973-74.

1

16, at 974.

'"141 U.S. 132(1891).
•'V^. at 152.

'""Horsey, supra note

""5ee also Smith, 448 A.2d
'"^See also

Kalplan

v.

at

873; In re Caremark International, Inc., 698 A. 2d at 967.

Centex Corp., 284 A.2d

Caremark International
'"^48 A. 2d at 858.

Inc.,

698 A.2d

at

970.

1

19,

124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Aronson, 473 A. 2d

at

812; In re

24

"[S]ince

management of

a

director

is

vested

with

the

responsibility

for

the

must execute that duty
with the recognition that he acts on behalf of others. Such obligation does
not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing. But fulfillment of the fiduciary
function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud.
Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a director an
affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical
eye in assessing information of the type and under the circumstances....
the affairs of the corporation, he

Thus, a director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment
is

in

the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished

from a duty of

loyalty.'"''

b)

The

director liability

example, the court

mAronson

v.

is

predicated upon a concept of gross negligence."^

Lewis "^ stated

For

that:

"[T]o invoke the rule's protection directors have a duty to inform
themselves,

prior

making

to

a

business

information reasonably available to them.

decision,

of

all

material

Having become so informed,

must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties. While
the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
the

standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment
rule director liability

is

predicated upon concept of gross negligence.

''^^^

In addition to the principles ruled by the court heretofore, in determining whether
to

impose

liability to

a director, the courts traditionally presume that in making a business

decision, the directors of a corporation acted

the honest belief that the action taken

was

on an informed

basis, in

good

the best interests of corporation."^

faith

and

in

Compliance

with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by
reference to the content of the board's decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from

'''Id. at

872-73. (emphasis added).

''^See also Litwin,

Co.

V.

25 N.Y.S. 2d

at

677-78; Aronson, 473 A. 2d

Technicolor, 634 A.2d at 345, 636 A. 2d at 956.

"'*473 A.

2d at 805.
812 & n. 6. (emphasis added).
""Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 812.
''''Id.

at

at

812; Smith, 488 A. 2d

at

858; Cede

&
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consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed.'"'' That

is,

whether

a court considering the matter after the facts believes a decision substantively wrong, or

degrees of wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational" provides no

ground for director

was

either rational or

employ

so long as the court determines that the process employed

liability,

employed

good

in

faith effort to

advance corporate

interests.

To

'^"^

a different rule—one that permitted an "objective" evaluation of the decision-

which would,

in the long-run,

called business

judgment

As

be injurious to investor

rule, to

be described

duty of care the American

to

by ill-equipped judges or

director to substantive second guessing

would expose a

Governance also

set the standards

in

Law

This court rule

interests.'"

Chapter IV,

juries,

is

infra.

Institute's

Principles

of Corporate

of duty of care for a director, by considering applicable

laws and the courts' rules relevant to duty of care:
Section 4.01 Duty of Care of [Directors]; The Business Judgment Rule
.

(a)

A

perform the director's or

[director] has a duty to the corporation to

officer's functions in

good

faith, in

a

maimer

that

he or she reasonably

believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care

an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to

that

exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.

Subsection (a)

is

This

subject to the provision of Subsection (c)

(the

business judgment rule) where applicable.
(1)

The duty

in

Subsection

(a)

includes the obligation to make, or

cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only

'''In re

Caremark

International Inc.,

698 A.2d

when, the

at 967.

'''Id.
151

Id.

& n.

6.

(The vocabulary of negligence while often employed,

A.2d 805 (1984)

is

e.g.

Aronson

not well-suited to judicial review of board attentiveness, see,

F.2d 880, 885-6 (2d Cir. 1982), especially

if

one attempts

v.

to look to the substance

evidence of possible "negligence." Where review of board functioning

is

Lewis, Del. Supr., 473

e.g.,

Joy

v.

North, 692

of decisions any

involved, courts leave behind as

who typically supplies
men and women to be encouraged to

a relevant point of reference the decisions of the hypothetical "reasonable person",
the test for negligence liability.

make
it

It is

doubtful that

we want

business

decisions a hypothetical persons of ordinary judgment and prudence might.

utility in large part

from

its

ability to

The corporate form

allow diversified investors to accept greater investment

risk.

those in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses on the basis of a
substantive judgment based upon what a person of ordinary or average judgment and average risk

assessment talent regard as "prudent" "sensible" or even "rational" such persons will have a strong
incentive at the margin to authorize less risky investment projects.)

If

get
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circumstances would alert a reasonable [director] to the need

The

therefor.

extent of such

inquiry

[director] reasonably believes to

(2) In

be such as the

shall

be necessary.

performing any of his or her functions (including oversight

function),

a [director]

entitled

is

to

on materials and

rely

persons in accordance with ss 4.02 and 4.03 (reliance on
directors,

employees,

officers,

other

experts,

persons,

and

committees of the board).
(b)

Except as otherwise provided by

statute

or by a standard of the

corporation and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility
oversight, in performing

the board

may

its

for

functions (including oversight functions),

delegate, formally or informally

by course of conduct,

any function (including function of identifying matters requiring the
attention of the board) to committees of the board or to directors,

committees and persons
ss 4.02

A

on such

is

accordance with

in

and 4.03.

[director]

who makes

duty under this Section
(1)

rely

duty under this Section with

in fulfilling the

respect to any delegated function if the reliance

(c)

may

a director

or other persons;

experts,

officers,

a business judgment in good faith

fulfills

the

if the [director]:

not interested in the subject of the business judgment;

is

informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment

(2) is

to

extent

the

the

[director]

reasonably

believes

to

be

appropriate under the circumstances; and;
believes that the business judgment

(3) rational

is

in the

best

interests of the corporation.
(d)

A person challenging the conduct of a
burden

of proving

breach

a

of

[director]

under

this Section

has

of

care,

including

the

duty

inapplicability of the previsions as to the fulfillment of duty under

Subsection (b) or
that

the breach

(c),

and

was

the

in a

damage

legal

action, the

burden of proving

cause of damage suffered by the

corporation....

The standards of duty of care
the

most jurisdictions today.'" This

forth

by the Model Act or

set

is

by the American

Law

Institute are articulated in

because such standards are boarder than theose

state corporation statutes,

by using the

set

different wordings, for

example, "director's functions" instead of " director's duty", and "rationally believes"
instead of "reasonably believes".

Mn

re

Caremark

International Inc.,

698 A.2d

at

967&

n. 15.
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2.

Duty of Loyalty

The second

legal

component of

director's fiduciary duty

is

a duty of loyalty.

Historically, the scope of duty of loyalty of director to a corporation has

by

judicial decision rather than
in

Guth

V.

Loft, Inc.,^^^ in

The

statute.

classic expression

been defined by

of duty of loyalty

which the Supreme Court of Delaware

is

found

stated that:

"Corporate [directors] are not permitted to use their position of
trust

and confidence

to further their private interests.

While technically

not trustee, [directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its

stockholders.

A

public policy, existing through the years, and derived

from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established

a rule that

demands of a corporate

or directors,

officer

peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty,
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed

injury to the corporation, or to deprive
skill

and

ability

would work
or advantage which his

from doing anything

to his charge, but also to refrain

might properly bring

it

to

of profit
it,

or to enable

that

it

to

make

in the

The rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall
The occasions for the
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and
varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated.
The standard of
reasonable and lawful exercise of

loyalty

is

measured by no fixed

its

power.

scale."'^'*

In order to understand the duty of care and duty of loyalty,

distinguish

among

their characteristics.

it

is

helpful to

The Corporate Director's Guidebook describes

the distinction of the characteristics of these

two

legal duties

of director as follows:

"Duty of Loyalty. By assuming his office, the corporate director
commits allegiance to the enterprise and acknowledges that the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any
individual interest of his own,

The basic

principle to be observed

the director should not use his corporate position to

or gain other personal advantage....

'"5 A. 2d 503 (Del. Sup. 1939).

'V^.

at 510.

make a

is

that

personal profit
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Duty of Care.

In addition to

corporation, the corporate director also
fulfilling the

owing a duty of loyalty to the
assumes a duty to act carefully in

important tasks of monitoring and directing the activities of

corporate management."'"

Considering the difference between these two duties,
negligence, mismanagement, and decisions to do wrongfiil acts

it

can be concluded that

cire

dealt with in the duty

of care, but fraud, self-dealing, misappropriation of corporate opportunities, improper
diversions of corporate assets, and similar matters involving potential conflict of interests

between a director and the corporation are considered

The conduct requirement under
component of

The duty of

its

of loyalty,

a.

and

which

which
is

'^^

the

is

second

required under the

shareholders and not engage in self-dealing.'^^

application of duty of loyalty are in

interest transactions;

duty of loyalty.

loyalty obligates the director to act at all times in the best

of the corporation and

common law

duty

the traditional fiduciary duty, parallels that

duty of care.'"
interests

the

in the

two

The

classic settings: (a) conflicts

of

(b) the corporate opportunities.'"

A Conflict of Interest Transaction

The common law

courts focused on the director's fiduciary duty

corporation, so substantive agreements between a corporation and

its

owed

director

to the

were void

'"The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. Law. 1591, 1599-1600 (1979).
'^^HARREY J. GOLDSCHMID, THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, SB40 ALI-ABA
159, 174(1996).

'"KiRSTEN
28

Tort «&

L.

Thompson, Liability of Professionals, Officers, and Directors: Annual Survey,

Ins. L.J. 376,

385 (1993).
v. Rooney, Pace,

"VJ.; See also Norlin Corp.

'"O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note

9, at

Inc.,

401

.

744 F. 2d 255, 264 (2d. Cir. 1984).
The duty of loyalty issues may arise

in the

context of a

variety of transaction; for example, conflict of interests transactions; usurpation of corporate opportunities;

competition with the corporation by director and improper use of corporate position, property, or
information, see ALI'S PRINCIPLES
conflict of interest transactions

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PART V.

and corporate opportunities.

In this thesis merely focus

on

29

or voidable simply because of a conflict of interest existed.'^"
interest is not inherently

In itself, a conflict of

and as the complexity and interconnection of

improper,'^'

conflicting interest transactions have been

American business increased,'"

viewed by courts as void or voidable because the courts themselves
contract and decide

Today

its

will look at the

fairness without shareholders' approval.'"

the duty of loyalty relevant to a conflict of interest transaction between a

and the corporation

director

no longer

"safe harbor" statute

is

generally treated by state corporation

was enacted

transactions voidable whether or not
disinterested.""^

common law

to ameliorate the

it

was

The Model Act provides

fair

rule

statutes.'^''

This

which made such

or approved by other directors

who were

the validity of director's conflict of interest

transaction as follows:

The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Chapter
8.3
(a)

1

:

8,

Subchapter C,

§

Director Conflict of Interest

A

conflict

in

which a

A

conflict of interest transaction

of

interest transaction is a transaction

with the corporation

director of the corporation has a direct or indirect interest.
is

not voidable by the corporation

solely because of the director's interest in the transaction if any one of

the following

is true;

(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest

were disclosed or known

to the

board of directors or committee

of the board of directors and the board of directors or

committee authorized, approved,
(2) the material facts

ratified the transaction;

of the transaction and the director's interest

known

were disclosed or

to the shareholders entitles to vote

and they authorized, approved, or
(3) the transaction
(b)

For purposes of

this

was

ratified the transaction; or

fair to the corporation.

section, a director

of the corporation has an

indirect interest in a transaction if (1) another entity in

'""Warden

v.

Union

Pacific R.R., 103 U.S. 651,

which he has a

658 (1988).

Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 104, at 1255.
'"O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 9, at 402.
'"Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS.
'"'The

LAW.

35, 35(1996).

'"^DEL.

Code Ann.

'"Balotti

&

8c

§

144

(a) (3).

Finkelstein,

The Delaware Law of Corporation and Business Organization, Law

Business 1985 with 1988 supplement,

§ 4.9.
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material financial interest or in which he
to the transaction or (2) another entity of

or trustee

is

is

a general partner

which he

is

is

a party

a director, officer,

a party to the transaction and the transaction

is

or should

be considered by the board of directors of the corporation....

This Section defines the terms "a conflict of interest transaction" as one which

does not a include transaction in which the director participates

in the transaction

only as

a shareholder or receives only a proportionate share of the advantage or benefit of the
transaction.'"

This Section, however, does not define "interested" director, '^^ but

normally, a director should be viewed as interested in a transaction

members of

his family

have a financial

if

he or immediate

interest in the transaction or a relationship with

the other parties to the transaction such that the relationship might reasonably be expected
to affect his

judgment

in the particular matter in a

The Model Act

defines a

method

conflict of interest transaction, that

directors or shareholders in the

automatically valid. '^^

The

is,

if

or

Section.

disinterested

automatic rule of voidability of

such transaction

is fair

maimer provided by

transaction in question

shareholders

to the corporation.'^*

to eliminate the

approval of conflict of interest transaction.
directors

manner adverse

That

is

or has been approved by

this Section, this transaction is

subject to special requirements for

is it is

according to

to

be approved by disinterested

the

process

provided

by

this

"°

If these requirements for approval, authorization, or ratification are not met, a

transaction

is

tested

'^''MODEL Bus. Corp.

by the court under the fairness

Act

§ 8.31 (b). Official

'*'Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 812.

law

if he

fi-om

it

A

director

is

test.

The

fairness of a transaction

Comment.

not considered to be "interested" under Delaware corporation

neither "appears on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit

in the

sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or

stockholders generally.

all

Id.

'''Id.

''"Id.

'™It

should be noted that the vote requires for authorization, approval, or ratification of a conflict of interest

transaction

is

more onerous than

corporate actions, see

the standard applicable to normal voting requirement for approval of

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT

§ 8.31 (b), Official

Comment.
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traditionally

transaction
length.

is

is

evaluated on the basis of facts and circumstances.'^'

deemed

fair if the disinterested

Normally, a

persons might have entered into the arm's

"2

With regard

Law

of interest transactions the American

to conflict

Institute's

Principles of Corporate Governance, also have applicable the standards:

Section 5.02. Transaction with the Corporation
(a)

General

A

rule.

corporation

compensation)
transaction

[Director]

than

(other

fulfills

a

who

enters into a transaction with the

transaction

involving

payment of

the

the duty of fair dealing with respect to the

if:

concerning

(1) Disclosure

transaction

is

made

the

to

of

conflict

the

who

decision-maker

corporate

the

and

interest

authorizes in advance or ratifies the transaction; and
(2) Either:

(A) The transaction

to the corporation

is fair

when

entered

into;

(B)The

transaction

authorized in advance,

is

following

disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the

by disinterested directors who could
reasonably have concluded that the transaction was fair

transaction

to the corporation at the time of such authorization;

(C) The transactions ratified, following such disclosure, by
disinterested

concluded

who

directors
that

the

corporation at the time

transaction

acted

who
the

for

have

reasonably

was

was entered

it

a corporation decision-maker
the

could

transaction

is

into,

the

to

fair

provided

(i)

not interested in

corporation

the

in

transaction and could reasonably have concluded that

the transaction
interested

was

[director]

fair

the corporation;

to

made

disclosure

to

the

(ii)

such

the

decision-maker pursuant to Subsection (a)(1) to the
extent he or she then

knew of the

material facts;

(iii)

the

interested [director] did not act unreasonably in failing
to

seek advance authorization of the transaction by

disinterested [directors];

advance

authorization

and
of

'"5ee, e.g.. Burg, 380 F.2d. 897 (1967); Sincare Oil Corporation

'"Sincare Oil Corporation, 261 A. 2d

at

v.

(iv) the failure to

the

obtain

transaction

by

Levin, 261 A. 2d 911 (1969).

923; Weinberger, 457 A. 2d 701, 710 (Del. Sup. 1983).
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disinterested

[directors]

did not adversely affect the

interested of the corporation in a significant

(D)The

transaction

is

such

following

and

shareholders,

way; or

authorized in advance or ratified,

by

disclosure,

does

not

disinterested

constitute

a

waste

of

corporate asset at the time of shareholder action

b.

Duty of

The Corporate Opportunities

loyalty instructs a director to be absolutely fair

personal

interests.'^''

unfairly

compete with

Hence, the duty of loyalty makes
his

it

and candid

in

pursuing

wrongful for a director

to

corporation or to unfairly divert corporate resources or

opportunities to his personal use."''

1.

The Corporate Opportunity

The courts have developed

Doctrine.

the scope of director's duty of loyalty based on

increasing sophistication and experience with the corporate form, and the need to

encourage honest decisions by a director and discourage direct or indirect devices by

which the
in

Burg

v.

director

may

benefit personally at the expense of the corporation.'^^

Horn^^^ stated that the corporate opportunity doctrine should not be used to bar

the corporate directors from purchasing any property

which might be

corporation, but only to prevent their acquisition of property

or

is

useftil

to the

which the corporation needs

seeking, or which they are otherwise under a duty to the corporation to acquire for

'"O'Kelley

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 317.

'''Id.
'''Id.

"'380

The Court

F.

2d 897

(2d. Cir. 1967).
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it.'"

In recent case, Cellular Information System, Inc.

Delaware stated

that:

"[A] corporate [director]
his

own

if:

opportunity;
business;

Broz,"^ the Supreme Court of

v.

(1)
(2)

(3)

the

the

corporation

opportunity

corporation

the

may

has

not take a business opportunity for
able

financially

is

within

is

an

interest

to

exploit

corporation's

the

or

expectancy

the

line

of
the

in

opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate
fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the

corporation.
....a [director]

the opportunity

is

may

take a corporate opportunity

corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity
(3) the corporation holds
(4) the

is

presented

if:

(1)

presented to the [director] in his individual and not his

[director]

no

interest or

is

not essential to the corporation;

expectancy in the opportunity; and

has not wrongfully employed the resources of the

corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity....

Thus, the contours of this doctrine are well established.
important to note, however, that the

tests... pro vide

It

is

guidelines to be

considered by a reviewing the court in balancing the equities of an
individual case.

No

one factor

is

dispositive and

into account insofar as they are applicable.

all

factors

must be taken

"'^^

In considering the director's duty of loyalty under the corporate opportunity
doctrine, the courts normally apply the line of business test or interest or expectancy test,

or corporate financial capability,'^" or combination of these tests.

As

regards corporate opportunities, the American

Law

'^'

Institute's Principles

of

Corporate Governance sets the formulation for taking of corporate opportunities by
analyzing the court judgment relevant to this proposition in the following content:

Section 5.05. Taking of Corporate Opportunities by [Directors]

'''Id. at

899.

"'673 A.2d 148(1996).
'^'/J. at

155 (citation omitted); see also Guth, 23 Del. Ch.

at

267, 5 A. 2d at 509.

J. Green & Co. v. Dunhill
249 A. 2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
'"5ee, e.g., Burg, 380 F. 2d 897 (2d. Cir. 1967); Johnston v. Green, 121 A. 2d 919 (Del. Ch. 1956); Equity
Corp. V. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 164-65, 221 A. 2d 494, 497 (1966).

'^°See, e.g.

Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A. 2d 503, (Del. Sup. 1939); David

International, Inc.
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(a)

General Rule.

A

may

[director]

not take advantage of a corporate

opportunity unless:
(1)

The

[director]

corporation and
interest

(2)

the corporate opportunity

offers

first

make

to

the

disclosure concerning the conflict of

and the corporate opportunity;

The corporate opportunity

is

rejected by the corporation; and

(3) Either:

(A) The

of

rejection

the

opportunity

to

fair

is

the

corporation;

(B)The opportunity

is

rejected in advance, following such

manner that
business judgment rule; or

disclosure, by [disinterested directors], in a
satisfies the standards

(C)The

rejection

such

following

of the

authorized

is

advance or

in

by

disclosure,

shareholders, and the rejection

is

ratified,

disinterested

not equivalent to a

waste of corporate assets;
(b) Definition

of the Corporate Opportunity. For purposes of this Section,

a corporate opportunity means:
(1)

Any

opportunity engage in a business activity of which a

[director]

become aware,

either:

(A) In connection with the performance of fimctions as a
[director],

or

under

circumstances

should

that

reasonably lead the [director] to believe that the person
offering the opportunity expects

it

to be offered to the

corporation; or

(B) Through the use of corporate information or property,
the

resulting

opportunity

is

one

that

the

if

[director]

should reasonably be expected to believe would be of
interest to the corporation; or

(2)

Any

opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a

becomes aware and knows is closely related
which the corporation is engaged or expects

senior executive

to

the business in

to

engage

2.

As

The Corporate Competition Doctrine

regards a director that competes with the corporation, there

standards, but in

common law

there

is

is

no statutory

such an obligation assumed by every

man and
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woman who
director

agrees to serve as a corporate director.'"'

from personally engaging

in material

The

duty, for example, prevents a

business competition with his corporation

made

without the approval of the corporation.'"' Broad statements are

some

court decisions to the effect that a director

long as he acts in good

faith, for

"[A] director

may compete

example, the Court in Burg

may

in the treatises

and

with his corporation as

V Horn^^*

stated that:

be barred from competing with his corporation

even though he does not by doing so appropriate a corporate opportunity.

But

[his]

duty not to compete, like the duty to offer opportunities to the

corporation,

is

measured by the circumstances of each case, so

that the

consideration which led us to hold that the properties acquired by the
[director]

[director]

was not corporate opportunities strongly suggest a finding
was free to compete by acquiring them."'"^

Regarding competition with the corporation, the American

Law

that

Institute's

Principles of Corporate Governance, describes the standards for competition with the

corporation by a director.

Section 5.06. Competition with the Corporation
(a)

General Rule. [Directors]

may

not advance their pecuniary interests by

engaging in competition with the corporation unless
(1)

Any

either:

reasonably foreseeable harm to the corporation from such

competition

may

is

outweighed by the benefit that the corporation

reasonably be expected to derive

from allowing the

is no reasonably foreseeable
harm to the corporation from such competition;
The competition is authorized in advance or ratified, following

competition to take place, or there

(2)

disclosure

concerning

the

conflict

competition, by disinterested
satisfies the standards

(3)

The competition
such

is

disclosure,

of

director,...,

interest

in

of the business judgment

and

the

a manner that
rule; or

authorized in advance or ratified, following

by

shareholders' action

is

the

disinterested

shareholders,

and

not equivalent to a waste of corporate

assets
"'Fender

V. Prescott,

101 A.D. 2d 418, 476 N.Y.S. 2d 128 (1984),

q^^, 64 N.Y. 2d 1077, 479 N.E. 2d

225, 489 N.Y.S. 2d 880 (1985).
'^Vc/.;

See also Morton

•'^380 F.

v.

2d 897 (1967).

"VJ. at901.

Rank America,

Inc.,

812

F.

Sup. 1062, 1070

(CD.

Cal. 1993).
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US

In conclusion, certainly, in the

fiduciary duty to his corporation and

its

owes

a

basic legal fiduciary duty

is

a director in a close corporation

The

shareholders.'^^

divided into two settings; duty of care and duty of loyalty. These two duties are typically
inherent in the director's office which are recognized by the legislature and judiciary even

does not provide for these duties explicitly.

though the

state legislature

who wants

to serve as a director in a close corporation

by looking

at state

More

must consider

this fiduciary

duty

corporation statutes and court decisions as to these propositions.

conveniently, one can easily understand the director's fiduciary duty as well

by the American

as his rights and responsibilities by studying the principles set forth
Institute's

Thus, anyone

Principles

of

Corporate

Govemance'^^

and

Corporate

the

Law

Director's

Guidebook'^^ in which both of these materials have established the principles, underlying
reasons, and explanation of each principle by analyzing the applicable law and court
decisions.

Principles of Corporate

new

Law

Furthermore, the principles set forth by the American

issues arising

Governance have been revised from time

from revising

resources for individuals

statutes

who want

to

Institute's

time in order to cover

and courts' decisions.'^'

These are

practical

to consider serving as a corporate director in

any

corporation including a close corporation.

C.

The

Director's Fiduciary Duty in a Limited

In Thailand the Commercial
the

company,

rather

he

is

Code recognizes

a representative

who

Company

in

Thailand

that a director is not

is

an employee of

appointed by the meeting of

488 A. 2d at 872.
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance was promulgated in 1994.
'**The Corporate Director's Guidebook- 1994 Edition provided by the American Bar Association.
"'A.A. Sommer, Jr., A Guide to the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 52
Bus. Law. 1331 (1996).
''"Smith,

'*^The current
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shareholders to be delegated power and authority of the company. '^^
director, typically,

provided

in the

As

a result, a

must manage corporation compliance with the company objectives

memorandum of association,

the articles of incorporation and by-laws.'*^'

In carrying out his managerial role, a director performs his duty independently, but under

supervision of the meeting of shareholders.'^^

The
law,'^^ but

which

director's fiduciary duty in Thailand also has

its

origins in English

common

Thai limited company law forms a unique approach for a limited company

differs

from those of a limited company

US. The Commercial Code

§

in

England and a close corporation

in the

1168 provides the standards of a director for performing

his duty.

The Commercial and

Civil

Code

§

1

168:

The

directors

must

in his

conduct

of the business apply the diligence of a careful businessman.
In particular they are jointly responsible;
(1) for the

payment of shares by the shareholders being actually

made;
(2) for the existence

and regular keeping of books and documents

prescribed by law;
(3) for

proper distribution of the dividend or interest as

the

prescribed by law;
(4) for the proper

enforcement of the resolutions of the general

meeting.

A director must not,

without the consent of the general meeting of

shareholders, undertake commercial transactions of the

competing with

that

third person, nor

of the company, either on his

may be

own

same nature

as

and

account or that of a

a partner with unlimited liability in another

commercial concern carrying on a business of the same nature as and
competing with that of the company.

'^The Supreme Court Decision No. 4477/1530 (1987).
'"Vajasith, supra note 76, at 151.

"^The Commercial Code § 1 144.
"^Thavee Chareonpitak, The Comprehensive Partnerships and Companies,

at

416

(4th e.d. 1961).
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This Section does not provide for the fiduciary duty of a director explicitly.

of director's conduct

forth the standards

company.
of

(a)

''*''

Nevertheless, this Section

is

in fulfilling his

managerial role

interpreted to cover the

It

sets

a limited

in

common law

duty of care; and (b) duty of loyalty of a director in managing the

fiduciary

company

affairs."'

1.

Duty of Care

The standard
is

that

for duty

of care

Commercial Code, Section

set forth in the

of "the diligence of a careful businessman".

director under Thai

law

is

consider the

facts

is

I,

This standard of duty of care of a

own

business.

Since a director assumes

the position of protecting the interest of others, the shareholders, he

businessman, there

168 ^

higher than that of the "ordinarily prudent person" and even

higher than that an ordinary person applies to his

Although, a director

duty as a professional.'^''

1

no bright

line to

is

must perform

his

required to exercise the due care of a

apply for this standard. '^^

Thus, courts generally

and the circumstances of traditional practice

in

each type of

business.'^*

Notwithstanding the fact that the Commercial Code §
relation

between the directors and company

standard of duty of care of a director

is

is

1 1

67 provides that the

governed by the agency

law,'^^ the

higher than that of agent because, unlike an agent

"' Id.
"- Id. at

420.

'""Charoenpitak, supra note 192,

at

420.

'"SOPHON RATTANAKORN, THE CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL CODE, PARTNERSHIPS AND COMPANIES, 372
1989).
''^Id.

"^the Commercial Code

§

1

167.

(2d.
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who must perform
the

company

freely

his duty under control

of the principal, a director

entitled to

by himself, not subject or under control of shareholders.

Generally, if the

company has more than one

entitled to delegate their

power

where the board delegates

its

^°°

The board

directors.^*"

or authority to committees or officers.'^°^

power or

manage

director, directors jointly carry

through the resolution of the meeting of board of

their duty

is

authority to committees or officers, the board has

performing the matters assigned. Thus, naturally, the scope of the director's
varied dependent upon the type and size of the
as well as circumstances.

is

In the case

ongoing responsibility for monitoring and overseeing the committees and officers

company

on

However,

company and

in

liability is

internal regulations

of the

to discharge his duty, a director

must

perform his duty with due care which meets the standard provided by corporation law,
otherwise, he shall be liable for his negligence.^°^

By

the nature of doing business, the

their interests.

A

director, as a

making business decisions
his decisions

company

for others,

representative responsible for

may be

which may cause damages

company and shareholders bare

the risk of

managing and

confronted with the unsatisfactory result of

to the

company.

In this event, a director

discharges his duty according to the standards provided by law

is

who

not liable for the

resulting damages.^"'*

In addition to a general duty of care, under Section
directors as a

whole must be jointly

1

liable for duties expressly

168 members of a board of

imposed by the law. These

^""According to Thai law shareholders merely have a right to supervise management
their interests. Shareholders cannot control or direct directors to

consider not be reasonable

^°'The

Commercial Code

Commercial Code

is

in his

§

1

order to protect

which directors

II. It

should be noted that the standard of duty of care under the

applied to directors individually, as well as Jointly as a board of directors.

Commercial Code

^°^The

Supreme Court Decision No.
is

in

activities

business decision.

169 H

^"^The

director

perform any

§ 11 64.
1

141/2502 (1959). The Supreme Court of Thailand decided that a

liable for his negligence.

Supreme Court Decision No. 1980/2519 (1976). The Supreme Court of Thailand decided that a
who performed his duty with a due care was not liable for misconduct of other directors that
caused damages to the company.

^°^The

director
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four imposed duties are mandatory.^"'

A

director

is

not entitled to be exonerated from

these duties by any means.

2.

Duty of Loyalty

The corporate
to

director's duty

an agent and a principal. ^"^

agent

is liable to

his principal. ^°^

of loyalty of director
1.

A

are, for

director

As

of loyalty

is

derived from the law of agency applied

a result, a director

The general

is liable

duties of an agent

to his

which

company,

like

an

are applied to duty

example:

must not enter

into

any transaction

if the

conflict of interest

between himself and the company occurred;^°^
2.

Any

pecuniary, property, or benefits derived from the performance of his

duties as a director
3.

must be delivered

Any damages

to the

to the

company;^°'

company occurred from

director's negligence because of

malpractice, misconduct or ultra vires, a director must be liable for such damages.^'"

Apart from the general duties derived from agency law, a director

Commercial law as

to a limited

which focuses on when a
indirectly.

company with

director unfairly

is

the duty of loyalty in Section

charged by
1

168, ^

III,

competes with his company either directly or

This Section prohibits a director from unfairly competing with the corporation

because of when a director manages and controls the company business, he

sets

and

implements company policy as well as knows about substantial confidential information

by the Commercial Code and other laws in which a limited company
must perform, thus the board of directors, a representative of the company, needs to be performed
these duties on behalf of the company. If the board does not perform these duties which cause any damages
to the company, the board must be liable for the breach of its duty.
^°*Rattanakorn, supra note 196, at 187.

^°^This four duties are prescribed
itself

^"Vajasith, supra note 76,
^°*The

Commercial Code

2°'M§810.
^'°/^.

§812.

at 172.

§ 805.
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in

connection with management and company business,^"

products and financial data.

If,

therefore, a director

company, the company and shareholders
the director to

will

compete with the company

The duty of

loyalty under the

is

have

is

e.g.

customers, markets, line of

permitted to compete with the

their interests diluted. ^'^

unfair for the

Commercial Code

company and

Permitting

shareholders.^'^

considered in two contexts:

is

competition with the company and conflict of interest transactions.

a.

The

Competition with the

Company

director's competition with the

(i)

Directly

As provided

1

168, the requirements of competition with the

are (a) commercial transactions of the
If the

same nature

commercial transaction

undertaken by the company, or

if

it is

the

same

as the
is

is

no fixed or

strict rule for

company, and

(b)

company

competing

not the same in nature as those

in nature, but the director is undertaking

the business in a different area, his/her actions are not

company.^'" There

divided into two settings:

is

Competing with the Company

in Section

with the company.

company

deemed

determining

to

when

be competition with the
there

is

the competition

with the company. ^'^ Traditionally, the courts consider the facts regarding the company
business and the commercial transactions alleged to be competing with the

^"Chareonpitak, supra note
^'^Id. at

192, at 423-24.

424.

^'"Rattanakorn, supra note 196,
'''Id.

at

378.

company
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including company's objectives and the line of business, the market, location of business,

and

size

of business.^'^

Being an Unlimited Partner

(ii)

in

Other Competing Commercial

Concern

The second prohibited

activity is that

of a director being an unlimited partner

other commercial concern carrying on business that
that

The underlying reason

of the company.

partner

entitled to

is

partnership as if he

is

manage

is

the

same

as and competing with

for this prohibition

is

that the unlimited

the partnership and has an interest in

a sole proprietor.^ '^

in

managing

that

Therefore, by this approach, the result

tantamount to a director competing with the company by himself as described in

is

(i),

supra.

However,

company

this provision is not

mandatory.

A

director

may compete

or be unlimited partner in other competing commercial concern if the meeting

of shareholders permits him to do so by authorization, approval or

may

with his

be.

This shareholders' authority

is

ratification, as the case

derived from the principle that the

company

incorporated by agreement between shareholders, and shareholders are the residential
claimants.

Hence, shareholders

the law, public policy or

b.

As

217'

may

agree on any matters as log as they do not violate

harm any other persons or public norms.

Conflict of Interest Transaction

to the conflict

The COMMERCIAL Code

of interest transaction there

§ 1025.

is

no provision that

explicitly
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By

prescribes the duty of a director with regard to conflict of interest transaction.

applying the law of agency a director owes the duty not to enter into any transaction

which a

conflict of interest

Commercial Code, Book
conduct

in the

event there

between the director and company

Furthermore, the

General Principles, Section 74 constraints representative

I

is

exists.'"*

in

a conflict of interest with his juristic person.^''' Applying this

Section with a director in limited company, a director cannot represent his corporation

when

there

a conflict of interest between a director and his company.

is

on both sides of a conflict of

will never appear

mandatory and thus a director

Section 74

is

interest

transaction.

It

company

is

noteworthy that

in conflict

of

this

Section prohibits a director from representing the

interest transaction, but

conflict of interest transaction.

it

Therefore, by interpreting this Section a director

enter into a conflict of interest transaction with the

transaction

is

does not deal with the validity of a

company and

this conflict

of

not void or voidable in so far as the director does not represent the

may

interest

company

in that transaction.

In case of a conflict of interest transaction

where there

is

no disinterested director

or the remaining disinterested directors are inadequate to constitute the

quorum

or

undertake this transaction compliance with the law, the Commercial Code^^° provides that
the interested person or the Public Prosecutor
representative.

may

request the court to appoint an

ad hoc

Alternatively, in practice, the meeting of shareholders will appoint an

hoc director or directors

to represent the

company

in case

ad

of a conflict of interest

transaction.

In

summary,

duty in Thailand

is

like the director's fiduciary

duty in the US, the director's fiduciary

divided into two basic duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

Commercial Code
Commercial Code
220'
The Commercial Code

^'*The

§ 805.

^''The

§ 74.
§

73 and

§ 75.
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The

director's fiduciary duty under Thai

slightly in detail

due

law may vary from those under the

to adjustments in the practicalities in

different evolution in business practice

and public policy.

US

law

each country resulting from

IV.

THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN THE US

The corporation law

in the

US, courts and

legislators limit, or sanction contractual

on the scope and impact of fiduciary duty,

limitations

particularly,

discipline directors in the performance of their official duties.

The

legislative limit,

when used

to

^^'

supplemented sometimes by judicial

rules,

includes (1)

exculpation provision making fiduciary duty, at least in part, a default rule that can be
contracted around; (2) rules limiting a corporation's
directors for

wrongdoing

power

in their official capacity; (3) rules

to

indemnify

its

officers

reducing the roles of fiduciary

duty as a regulator of conflict of interest transactions; and (4) regulation derivative
including

rules

review of directors'

of

^^^

The major court-made

A.

suits,

allowing directors under certain circumstances to take control

derivative litigation.

and

limit is the business

judgment

rule,

which

restricts judicial

official conduct.^"

Historical

Background

Concurrent with the development of the concept of a director's duty of care and
duty of loyalty, courts have recognized the need for judicial restraint against imposing
liability

on corporate

^^'O'Kelley

fiduciaries for

more

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 3

1

errors of judgment."'^'' Here, too, the concept of

8.

''V^. at 318-19.

^"M

at

318.

^^"HORSEY, supra note

1

16, at 975.
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limiting the liability of directors by exonerating
in

English

common law as
US, the

In the

common law

old as

rule

them

for

judgmental error has

its

origins

duty of care^^^ and duty of loyalty.

of judicial deference for judgment error of a director finds

expression as early as 1829 by state court in Louisiana.^^''

In 1850, a

Rhode

Island state

court expressed similar judicial concern for exculpating directors for judgmental error in

Hodges

V.

New England Screw Co.

'^^^

The most understanding and balanced

of corporate

articulations

directors

fiduciary duty of care and duty of loyalty ,^^^in the context of the operation of the business

judgment

however, has been found in a decision of Litwin

rule,

Supreme Court

Allen^^"^ the

[Djirectors are liable for negligence in the performance of their

Not being

insurers, directors are not liable for errors

for mistakes while acting with reasonable skill

said that a director

is

of judgment or

and prudence.

It

has been

required to conduct the business of the corporation

with the same degree of fidelity and care as an ordinarily prudent

would exercise

in the

management of

and importance. General
last analysis,

rules,

his

own

of like magnitude

[i.e.

violated the duty of care], depends

upon the

and circumstances of particular case, the kind of corporation

involved,

its

size

and financial resources, the magnitude of the transaction,

bestow the care and

skill'

which the

situation

...But clairvoyance is not required

A director is called upon

make

'to

demands.

even of a bank

recognizes that the most conservative director

is

director.

The law

not infallible, and that he

mistakes, but if he use that degree of care ordinarily exercised

by prudent bankers he will be absolved from

may

man

however, are not altogether helpful. In the

and the immediacy of the problem presented.

will

affairs

whether or not a director has discharged his duty, whether or

not he has been negligent
facts

New

stated that:^^°
"...

duties.

v.

liability

although his opinion

turn out to have been mistaken and his judgment faulty.

^"1 R.I. 312 (1850), reh'g granted, 3 R.l. 9 (1853)(Cited in HORSEY, supra note

^^^HORSEY, supra note 1 16, at 975.
'"25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).

""HORSEY, supra note 1 16, at 975.
'^'Litwin, 25 N.Y.S. 2d at 678 (citation

omitted).

"^^'

1

16, at 975).

York

47

A business judgment presumption has evolved over the years in favor of directors.
This presumption protects decisions from being questioned
director

make

impose

B.

The

liability

courts have ruled the business

judgment

rule in determining

Principle of the Business

rule has

Judgment Rule

been developed by court and well established

courts have ruled and explained the business

The Court

whether

of director."^

There are no statutory formulation of the business judgment

judgment

when informed

reasonable business judgment in discharging of his fiduciary duty to the

corporation."'
to

in hindsight

judgment

in Gries Sport Enterprises, Inc.

v.

rule."''

The business

in the case laws, but

rule diversely,"^ for example:

Cleveland Browns Football Co.,

/wc.^^^explained that:

"The business judgment rule
that has
It

been part of the

is

common law

principle of corporate governance

for at least

one hundred

fifty years.

has traditionally operated as a shield to protect directors from

for their decisions. If the directors are entitled to protect

of the

liability

rule,

then

the courts should not interfere with or second-guess their decisions.

If

directors are not entitled to protection of the rule, then the court scrutinize

the decision as to

its

intrinsic fairness to the corporation

minority shareholders. The rule
better

is

and corporation's

a rebuttal presumption that directors are

equipped than the court to make business judgments and that the

directors acted without self-dealing or personal interest

reasonable diligence and acted with good

faith.

A

and exercised

party challenging a

board of directors' decision bears the burden of rebutting the presumption

^^^See generally

HORSEY, supra note

1

16.

'''Id.

^^"The

Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized

that

under Delaware law, the business judgment rule

is

488 A. 2d. at 872.
"^Charles Hansen, Symposium on Concept Governance, The Duty of Care, The Business
Judgment Rule and American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. Law.

the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141 (a); See Smith,

1355, 1360(1993).

"M96 N.E. 2d 959

(Ohio 1986).
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that the decision

was a proper exercise of

the business

judgment of the

board.'"''

The Court

Wheeler

in

however, fundamental

"It is,

majority of

Pullman Iron and Steel Company^^^

v.

its

in the

stated that:

laws of corporations, that the

stockholders shall control the policy of the corporation, and

regulate and govern the lawful exercise of

its

franchise and business.

Everyone purchasing or subscribing for stock in a corporation impliedly
agrees that he will be bound by the acts and proceedings done or
sanctioned by a majority of the shareholders, or by the agents of the
corporation duly chosen by such majority, with the scope of the power

conferred by the charter, and court of equity will not undertake to control

methods of a corporation, although it may be seen
that wiser policy might be adopted and the business more successful if
other methods were pursued. The majority of shares of its stock, or the
agents by the holders thereof lawfully chosen, must be permitted to control
the policy and business

the business of the corporation in their discretion,
its

charter or

some public

when

not in violation of

law, or corruptly and fraudulently subversive of

the rights and interests of the corporation or of a shareholder."^'^

The Delaware Court

"We have
managers

of a

in

Davis

then

a

v.

Louisville

conflict

corporation

and

in

the

gas

& Electric Co. ^''°ruled that:

view between the responsible
overwhelming majority of its

stockholders on the one hand and the dissenting majority on the other-a

matter of business policy, such as has occasioned

conflict touching

innumerable applications to courts to intervene and determine which of the

two

conflicting views should prevail.

such applications

is

that

it is

The response which court make

questions of the policy and business management.

chosen

to

pass upon such question and

tainted with fraud

is

faith

and was designed

to

serve."^"

"7^.

at

'''143

963-964.

111.

^'"Id. at

197,32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892).

207.

''°16 Del. Ch. 157, 142
""/i/. at

159, 142

A

A 654 (1928).

654

at

659.

their

The

directors are

judgment unless shown

to

be

The judgment of the directors of
of a presumption that it was formed in good

accepted as

corporations enjoys benefit

to

not their function to resolve for corporations'

final.

promote the best

interest

of the corporation they
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Traditionally,
disinterested director
to

business

the

who made

judgment

rule

has

offered

safe

harbor

for

a

honest, informed business decisions reasonably believed

be in the best interests of his corporations.^''^ In

reasoning behind the business judgment rule

one commentator said the

effect, as

four-fold:

is

by recognizing human fallibility, the rule encourages
to assume directorships.
Second, the rule
competent
recognizes the business decisions frequently entail risk, and thus provides
directors the board discretion they need in formulating dynamic and
"First,

individuals

effective

company

'recognizes

rule

policy without fear of judicial second guessing.

that

shareholders to

a

very

The

degree voluntarily

real

undertake the risk of bad business judgment; investors need not buy stock,

of opportunities less vulnerable to

for investment markets offer an array

mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.'

Third, the rule keeps court

from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making, a task
which they are admittedly ill-equipped to handle.... Finally, the rule
ensures that directors rather than shareholders

manage

corporations."^"^

Notwithstanding confusion with respect to the business judgment rule has been
created by the

numerous varying formulations of rules and

facts.

Courts have often stated

the rule incompletely or with an elliptical shorthand reference.^"''
Institute's Principles

judgment

rule

§ 4.01

of Corporate Governance

sets forth the standard

of the business

by analyzing the court relevant decisions:
(c)

fulfills the

A

director...

who makes

duty under this Section

a business judgment in good faith

if the director...:

(1) is not interested.. .in the subject of the business
(2) is

The American Law

judgment;

informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the

extent the director... reasonably believes to be appropriate under the

circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business

judgment

is in

the best interests of

the corporation."^''^

^"^R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Symposium on Corporate Governance, Rejudging
THE Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. Law. 1337, 1338-39(1993).
^"'Kristin A. Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look
AT Conflicts of Interest and Business Judgment Rule, 24 Harv.J. on Legis. 527, 527 (1987).
^''^ALl's Principles of Corporate Governance, Comment to § 4.01, ALI-CORPGOV (1994).
^''^ALl's Principles of Corporate Governance, Part IV. Duty of Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, Analysis and Recommendation, ALI-CORPGOV § 4.01 (c) (1994).
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Besides, another source for the basic standards of business judgment rule in the

US

the Corporate Director's Guidebook^''^

is

which explains the business judgment

rule

as follows:
"....This
liability to the

protects a disinterested director

rule,....

corporation and

its

from personal

shareholders, even though a corporate

decision the director has proved turns out to be unwise or unsuccessful. In

reviewing a disinterested director's conduct, a court will not substitute

judgment

(particularly in hindsight) for that

its

of the director, provided that

the director:

-acted in

good

faith;

-was reasonable informed; and
-rationally believed the action taken

was

in the best interests

of the

corporation.

Accordingly, the business judgment rule, unlike the standard of

conduct encompassed

in the duties

of care and loyalty,

is

not a description

of a duty or standard used to determine whether a breach of duty has
occurred; rather

it

is

an element of judicial review use in analyzing

director conduct to determine whether a director should be held personally
liable.

If the rules applies, directors are

judgment

in

good

faith

and

presumed

to

have exercised

in the rational belief that the actions

their

were

taken in the best interests of the corporation. In such circumstance, a court
will not

examine the merits of the decision of directors or

substitute

it

judgment regarding the wisdom of a decision within the business
"^''^
judgment of directors.

Although the business judgment rule

exists in the

US

corporation law, there has

been no a universal standard of the business judgment rule that can apply to

As

the court said "the business

of conduct."^''^

The

judgment

rule is a tool

applicability of business

all states.^'**

of judicial review, not a standard

judgment

rule

depends on the

facts

^"^CoRPORATE Director's Guidebook- 1994 Edition, supra note 104.
^''Id. at

^''^For

1254.

discussion on the differences of three major positions on the business judgment rule and their
its true meaning, see BOLOTTI
496 N.E. 2d. 959, 964 (Ohio 1986).

passion for universal agreement on
'"'Oris Sports Enterprises,

&

HANKS,

JR.,

supra note 241.

on a
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case-by-case basis and has been developing in the

US

courts, especially the

Court of

Delaware.^^°

Relationship between the Business Judgment Rule and the Director's

C.

Fiduciary Duty

1.

The Business Judgment Rule and Duty of Care

Courts often describe the line between
business judgment

rule.^^'

judgments unless his conduct
to

have acted

judgment

Under
is

and non-liability by reference

this rule, courts refuse to

sufficiently egregious.'^"

in a grossly negligent

to

second-guess director's

However,

if

a director

is

found

manner, then he will not be protected by the business

rule.^"

The business judgment
aspects: a) non-decision

rule is related with the duty

making context or substantive due

making context or procedural due

a.

A

liability

director

of care
care;

in

two primary

and b) a decision

care.^^"

A Non-decision Making Context or Substantive Due Care

is

found

liable in the non-decision

making context only upon an

express abdication of responsibility or upon obvious and prolonged failure to exercise

""Hansen, Johnston & Alexander, The Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict"
Transactions; the ALI Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus. Law 2083
(1990).

"'O'Kelley

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 346.

'''Id.
'''Id.

""Hansen, supra note 234,

at

1356.
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oversight or supervision.
Aller?^^

^'"^

The

The court explained

classic case for this standard ruled

by court

is

Liiwin

of director for duty of care based on gross

liability

negligence as follows:

would seem that if it is against public policy for a bank,
anxious to dispose of some of it securities, to agree to buy them back at
the same price, it is even more so where a bank purchases securities and
gives the seller the option to buy them back at the same price, thereby
incurring the entire risk of loss with no possibility of gain other than the
interest derived from the securities during the period that the bank hold
"[I]t

them. Here,

if the

market price of the securities should

the repurchase option would exercise

from the bank

at the

market price should

lower price
fall,

price of the securities

is

at

it

rise,

the holder of

in order to recover his securities

which he sold them

to the bank.

If the

the seller holding the option will not exercise

it

Thus any benefit of a sharp rise in the
assured the seller and any risk of heavy loss is

and the bank will sustain the

loss.

assumed by the bank. If such an option agreement as
it would force the bank to set aside
months whatever securities it had purchased....

here

inevitably

is

involved were sustained,

for six

Director are not in the position of trustees of an express trust who,
regardless of

good

personally liable for losses arising from and

faith, are

infraction of their trust deed.

I

find liability in this transaction because the

arrangement was so

entire

improvident,

so

risky,

so

unusual

and

unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of prudent

banking

practice....

What sound reason
investment,

short

term

or

there for a bank, desiring to

is

otherwise,

to

buy

securities

make an
under

a

arrangement whereby any appreciation will inure to the benefit of the
seller

and any

differential is

loss will be borne

by the bank? The five and one-half point

no answer. It does not meet the fundamental objection that
is would have to be borne by the Bank and whatever

whatever loss there

gain would go to the customer. There
business judgment as to which

is

no more here than a question of

men might

"^O'Kelley

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 346.

"'25 N.Y.S. 2d 667.

"7^.

at

697-699.

The

directors

which the

situation

well differ.

plainly failed in this instance to bestow the care

demanded.'""

v.

.
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It is

well established that

when

a director

is

not exercising business judgment, the

business judgment rule and the necessar}' limitations

imposes on the duty of care do not

it

apply"«

b.

A

Decision

Director's conduct

Making Context or Procedural Due Care

is

assessed by looking

at

how

they reached a particular

decision rather than by looking at the substance of the decision itself.^"

not be found liable although the decision itself

by the ordinary prudent
directors

To

person.^^°

was not one

director will

would have been made

that

due care obligations,

satisfy their procedural

must carry out a decision-making process calculated

information sufficient to reach a rational judgment.'^^'

The

them with

to provide

A director can make a decision that

would not have been made by the ordinary prudent person or escape
appropriate processes provided by law are followed.^^^

was followed

will be

making

judgment

in

Smith

v.

rule applies to the in duty

context.^^^ In that case the

between the business judgment

Whether the appropriate process

Van

Gorkorn^^'^ firmly established that

of care standard regarding the decision

Supreme Court of Delaware explained the

rule

of the fundamental principle, codified

in 8 Del. C.

business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are

board of directors.

.

.

"^Hansen, supra note 234, at 1359.
"'O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note
^*°Hansen, supra note 234,

at

'"/c/. at

9, at

348

1356.

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 348
at 1357 & n. 13.

^"Hansen, supra note 234,
1358.

'"448 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

"^Hansen, supra note 234,

at 1357.

relationship

and the duty of care as follows:

"Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule

^^'O'Kelley

if

measured by court against concept of gross negligence.^"

The Delaware Supreme Court
the business

liability

§

is

141

the offspring
(a), that

the

managed by or under

its
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In carrying out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an

unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and

its

shareholders....

business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the

full

and

The
free

power granted to Delaware directors.... The
making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
exercise of the managerial
rule

a presumption that in

itself "is

corporation"....

The determination of whether a business judgment

is

an informed

one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves "prior

making

business

a

of

decision,

all

information

material

to

reasonably

available to them....

Under
directors

the business

who made

A

judgment

rules there

is

no protection for

an unintelligent or unadvised judgment....

director's duty to inform himself in preparation for a decision

derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation and
its

stockholders....

Since

a

management of

director

is

vested

with

the

responsibility

the affairs of the corporation, he

with the recognition that he acts

must execute

for

the

that duty

on behalf of others. Such obligation does

But fulfillment of the fiduciary
function requires more than the mere absence of the bad faith or fraud.

not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing.

Representation of the financial interests of others impress on a director an
affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye
in assessing information

here.

of the type and under the circumstances present

Thus, a director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment

in the nature

of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.

Here, there were no allegations of fraud, bad

Hence,

thereof

is

it

presumed

faith,

or self-dealing, or proof

that the directors reached their business

good faith, and considerations of motive and irrelevant to the
The standard of care applicable to a director's duty of care
has also been recently restated by this court. In Aronson, supra, we stated:
'While the Delaware case use a variety of terms to describe the

judgment

in

issue before us.

applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business

judgment

rule

director

liability

is

predicted

upon concept of gross

negligence.'

We

think that the concept of gross negligence

is

also the proper

standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board

of directors was a informed

'^M

at

872-73.

one."^^^
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As

between duty of care and the business judgment

to the relationship

American Law

Principles

Institute's

of Corporate

rule, the

Governance has explained

relationship by analyzing the applicable statute relevant to duty of care

this

and the court

decisions as well as the business in real world. In the Introductory Note, Part IV. Duty of

Care

and

Business

Judgment

Rule,

Principles

of Corporate

Govemance,^^^

"Principles" guide states:

have play the central

"Historically, courts rather than legislatures
role in shaping the

and

officers.

states

law regarding the duty of care of corporate directors

In the past 25 five years, however, over two-third of the

have enacted statutory provisions concerning the duty of care....
....It

should be emphasized

out

at the

set,

however, that these are

general legal standards and their application, in most instances, will

involve subtle evaluations of specific facts and circumstances.

complexity and the scale of
uncertainties
officers

many modem

and complexities related

—caution

corporations

to

the

The

—and unavoidable

of directors and

roles

against unrealistic, harsh application of part

IV 's general

standards....

Directors obviously should not be required to insure that every
potential

corporate problem

wrongdoing

(e.g.

is

anticipated

looting by the employee)

complexity and scale of
officers to rely heavily

many modem

or that
is

every instance of

prevented.

Indeed, the

corporations compel directors and

on other directors or

officers,

employees, experts,

other persons, and committees of the board.... In general, courts applying

duty of care standards should recognize that reliance

is

essential in

many

corporate contexts and that there are inherent dangers in judging a failure

by directors or officers
....

to act or foresee in the stark light

The business judgment mle provides a

of hindsight.

special protection to

informed business decisions as distinguished, for example, from continued
inattention to doctoral obligations.

business judgment mle

broad protection

to,

is

The basic policy underpinning of the

that corporate

law should encourage, and afford

informed business judgments (whether subsequent

event prove the judgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking,
innovation, and other creative entrepreneurial activities.

accept the risk that an informed business decision

and rationally believed

to

Shareholder

—honestly undertaken
—may not

be the best interest of the corporation

be vindicated by subsequent success.

The

special protection afforded

^^^INTRODUCTORY NOTE, PART IV. DUTY OF CARE AND BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, PRINCIPLE
Corporate Governance (1994), ALI-CORPGOVPT. IV INTRO, available in WESTLAW.

S

OF

the

.
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business judgments

is

also based

on a desire

to limit litigation

and judicial

intrusiveness with respect to private-sector business decision-making.

The

facts that directors

legal implications.

In

[]

act as a

group has important practical and

becoming informed with respect

to the subject

of

the business judgment, for example, directors, in addition to drawing on
their

own

backgrounds, any learn form, or rely on, the discussions of their

fellow directors as well

management

as

backgrounds of individual

presentations.

directors, the distinct role

The

different

each plays in the

corporation, the value of maintaining board cohesiveness, the magnitude

of the matter under consideration, the time frame
be made, and similar factors are

in

which a decision must

when determining whether

relevant

all

director "is informed with respect to the subject of the business
to the extent the director... reasonably believes to

the circumstance.

.

a

judgment

be the appropriate under

.

Since, the business

judgment of the board of directors

[]

are not

decisions of individuals, and since oversight obligations rest on the board
as a whole..., difficult causation issues will often arise.... That question

depend on whether the

damage

acts or omissions

to the corporation....

A

director

were the legal causation of any

who

fails to

perform an oversight

may have caused no damage

obligation, for example,

to the corporation

because the failure was rendered harmless by the care of other directors.
Finally,

it

should be remembered that in large measure director

properly carry out their function because of motives unrelated to their
legal obligations, including a personal sense

and career incentives,
discipline instilled

pride,

of responsibility, economic

professionalism, peer pressures, and the

by competitive markets and tender

For well

offers.

over one hundred years, however, courts and legislatures have considered
legal standards with respect to duty

of care to be a necessary protection for

As

corporations and their shareholders.
all

is

true of professionals

other in our society, the accountability of directors

is

and almost

a legitimate

public policy concern. [Standard set by ALI's Principles of corporate

governance

in] Part

IV

reflects this

concern as well as a recognition of the

need to encourage individuals with vision,
corporation. Fairness to those
clearly an essential value.

^Id. at

1-2.

"^^^

who

ability

and expertise

to serve

are willing to serve as directors

is
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The Business Judgment Rule and Duty of Loyalty

2.

As

described in Chapter

demands a corporate

director

III,

not

Part B, public policy has established a rule that

only

affirmatively

protect

the

of the

interests

corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would

work

injury to the corporation or to deprive the corporation of profit or advantage

which

make

in the

his skill

and

ability

might properly bring to

reasonable and lawful exercise

its

power.^^^

very clearly understood concept.^^°

Duty of

it,

or to enable corporation to

Unlike duty of care, duty of loyalty
loyalty issues

may

is

not a

arise in the context

of a

variety of transactions, including: sales to, or purchases by the corporation from directors

or entities in which the directors have an interest; dealing between the parent corporation

and

its

corporate

acquisitions

and reorganization transactions;

perpetuate control; sale of control;
suits;

by a majority shareholder

subsidiary; unfair treatment of minority shareholders

use

demands of stockholders

of corporate
to

commence

funds

in

to

derivative

excessive compensation; insider trading; usurpation of corporate opportunities;

competition with the corporation by officers or directors; and improper use of corporate
position, property, or information.^^'

Basically, the duty of loyalty

and

self-interest.

overcome when

it

demands

that there shall

be no conflict between duty

Therefore, the presumption of the business judgment rule will be

can be shown that a director stood on both sides of a transaction or

otherwise interested in the transaction and was in position to control

its

is

outcome.^^^

2d503at510.
""The Committee on Corporate Law, Report, Changes in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act-Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. Law. 695, 697 ( 990).
"'E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of The Counselor's Role, 45 Bus. Law.
'*'Guth, 5 A.

1

2065, 2065-66

& n.4 (1990).

III, et al.. New Developments: The Business Judgment Rule
for Control Under Delaware Law, C938 ALl-ABA 329, 336.

^^^A.

Gilchrist Sparks,

in

Contests
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RJR Nabisco

In In re

judgment

in

elements:

(i)

decision

is

shareholder

court described the business

connection with the duty of loyahy form of review as encompassing three
a threshold review of the objective financial interests of the board

under attack,

(ii)

a review of the board's subjective motivation, and

objective review of the process by which

may review

litigation,^^^ the

it

reached the decision under

the substance of a business decision

made by an

board for the purpose of assessing whether the decision

bounds of reasonable judgment

that

it

is

review.'^^'^

whose
(iii)

A

an

court

apparently well-motivated

so egregious, so far beyond the

seems inexplicable on any ground other than bad

faith.2''

The

issues relevant to the relationship

loyalty appear
litigation,

where there

which

is

is

between business judgment rule and duty of

a conflict of interest transaction, especially, derivative

by inadequate process provided by the corporation

tainted

Because the general concept underlying the duty of loyalty

is

^'^

statute.

that a director refrain

from

the self-dealing application of the loyalty principle can be difficult and highly fact-

When the

intensive.^"

duty of loyalty line

entire fairness of transaction.^^^

Weinberger

V.

UOP,

Inc-?'^

There

is

directors of a

no

As

is

crossed, the directors

the Delaware

must demonstrate the

Supreme Court of Delaware

'safe harbor for... divided loyalties in

Delaware.

states in

When

Delaware corporation are on both sides of the transaction,

they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most

scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of fairness
unflinching in

its

demand where one

he has the burden of establishing
test

its

is

stands on both sides of a transaction,
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the

of careful scrutiny by the court.

'"[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CHH) ^ 94, 194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989). (cited in JAME
E. Spiotto, Director and Officer Liability: Who Watches the Watchmen?, 93 1 PLI/Corp 361
(1996).

"^MoDEL Bus. CORP. Act

§ 8.31;

"'Veasey, supra note 270,

at

"'457 A.2d 701,

at

710

Del.

Code Ann.

2065.

(citation omitted).

§144.
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As

the Courts have ruled, the key threshold inquiries in duty of loyalty issues are:

whether the director has an

interest

in

the transaction and whether the director

is

independent.^*"

A director is considered to

be "interested''

if

he either appears on the both sides of

a transaction or expects to derive personal financial benefit from the transaction in the

sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or

However, the

shareholders generally.^*'

combined

entities

is

fact that the

director

may be

all

a director of

not of itself generally viewed as tainting his independence.^*^

Furthermore, the fact that a director in a close corporation owns shares of the corporation
has not been deemed as a financial interest inconsistent with the exercise of his fiduciary

duty on behalf of the corporation and his fellow shareholders.^*^

Even
whether he

A

director

is

is

if

a director

"independenf

deemed

A

.

not interested, the further inquiry in certain contexts

That

is,

he

is

is

capable of rendering independent judgment.^*''

be independent when he

to

the merits of the issue at
influence. ^*^

is

is in

a position to base his decision on

hand rather than being governed by extraneous considerations or

director will

have

lost his

personal or other relationships the director
the independent director, one

independence
is

if the facts

show

that through

beholden to the controlling person.^*^ As to

commentator noted

that

most cases dealing with a

director's

independence suggest that a director must be a direct and substantial beneficiary of the

^*°Veasey, supra note 270,

'"Aronson, 473 A.2d

at

2067-68.

at 812.

Holt Frankle, Fiduciary Duties of Directors Considering Business Combination, 895
PLI/C0RP295, 301-02 (1995).
'''Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 957-58 (Del. 1985)
'''Mat 812-816.
'''Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1189.
"'Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 815.

^^^DiANE
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challenged

transaction

order

in

for

a

court

to

conclude

that

lacks

director

the

disinterestedness and independence.^*^
If

if

such decision-making

proper

judgment

intra-corporate

is

infected with a lack of independence or self-interest, or

decision-making

mechanisms

are

not

used,

business

the

rule does not apply to protect the director and the burden of proof will be

director to demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction.

The general decision

principle

applies to protect a director for
into the fairness

or less than

of the

is that, in

making business

transaction.^*^

on the

^^^

a case where the business judgment rule
decision, there will be

no judicial inquiry

Nevertheless, even disinterested director approval

unanimous shareholder's approval cannot overcome a showing of waste,

illegality, ultra vires, or fraud.'^^°

It is

crucial to note that if the business

Supreme Court of Delaware
inapplicability of the business
liability.

It

simply

shifts the

in

Cinerama

judgment

judgment
v.

rule does not apply in a case the

Technicolor^^^

rule will not be a

burden to the defendants,

affirmative showing that the challenged transaction

was

explicitly

FINKELSTEIN

who

will

have

entirely fair.^^^

& BIGLER, THE DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF LOYALTY,

at

make an

If the deal

test.^^^

at

9 (January, 1987).

815-16.

^^"See, e.g.,

Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A. 2d 103, 1 1 1 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. Ch.), rev 'd and remanded, 92 A.2d 594

AC Acquisition Corp.

^"^See, e.g., Gottieb v.

(Del. Ch. 1952).

"'No. 8358 (Del. July

'''Id.

to

FOURTEENTH ANNUAL

Securities Regulation Institute, University of California, Sandiago
^*'/c/.

17, 1995).

v.

that

per se indicator of director

the result of an arm's-length negotiation, the transaction meets the fairness

^^''BALOTTI,

stated

was

V.

PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND DEVICES OF A DIRECTOR

Introduction

A.

Assuming a

makes decisions

director in a close corporation continuously

that

involve the balancing of rules and benefits for the corporation, in effect, the director bears
the liability of his performance for the corporation.^^'' In the face of this risk, the director

may

fear that his duty

would choose

his personal business. ^^^

Numerous

directors

to resign or refuse reelection rather than continue to act for corporations

that could not provide

directors

would jeopardize

who chose

any protection or adequate protection.^^^

to serve as director or

Indeed, even those

remain in board are discouraged from making

the kinds of decisions necessary to stimulate corporate growth or prosperity. ^'^

The

protective measures and devices provided for the director in a close corporation, thus

become necessary

to ensure that a director

would zealously perform

his duty, assured

that, instead, his

corporation would bear the reasonable expenses necessary to defend the

director's honest

and

As

integrity.

^^*

to the purposes of protective

measures and devices designed for the director to

use to protect himself in performing his duty for the corporation, the Court in Cramer

Generak

Tel.

^'"O'Kelley
^^'Denis

J.

606(3ded.

&.

&

Elec. Corp.^^^

Thompson, supra

summarized them as follows:

(a)

encourage

v.

initiative in

note 9, at 370.

Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors,
1989).

^''Michael W. Mitchll, Comment,

North Cololina's Statutory Limitation on Directors'

Wake Forest L. Rev. 117, 118 (1989).
"^William E. Knepper & Dan A Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officer and Directors,
Liability, 24

654 (4th ed. 1988).
'^582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d

Cir. 1978).
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§

20.04

at

62

enterprise decision; (b) encourage qualified persons to serve as director; (c) encourage

decision-making by independent directors; and (d) give the director wide latitude
handling of corporate

affairs.

protective measures and devices provided by corporation law in the

The

distinguished from those of Thai limited
explicit provisions in Thai

must be used by

in their

law as

company

directors in limited

companies

in

are

Because of the lack of the

law.

to this proposition, the

US

freedom

to contract

approach

Thailand to protect themselves from

personal liability occurred in discharging these duties for the companies.

protect

US

B.

Protective Measures and Devices under

US

corporation law provides three approaches for permitting a corporation to

its

directors. Conversely, a director

himself for

liability

Corporation Law^'^"

can use these three approaches to protect

incurred from his performance in discharging his duty for the

corporation. These three basic approaches are: (1) statutory indemnification; (2) statutory
limitation

on

liability;

1.

State

and

(3) liability insurance.^*"

Statutory Indemnification

indemnification

statutes

vary

greatly,

but

indemnification in excess of that authorized by the statute
public

policy. ^°^

While most indemnification

is

a

the
is

is

Delaware which are deemed
^°'E.

going to
to be a

cite the

model

specify

valid as long as

matter

^""Because the statutory provisions pertaining the indemnification, limitation
states are varied, this Part

generally

of contract,

liability,

it

satisfies

in

certain

insurance in every

Model Bus. Corp. Act and General Corporation Law of

for other states in these matters.

Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of

Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. Law, 399, 401 (1987).
Waltuch v. ContiCommodity Services, 833 F. Sup. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

^°^5ee, e.g.,

that

63

circumstances a director

may have

The indemnification permitted by

a

common law

the statute

statutory right to indemnification/"'

comes

in

four versions: (a) mandatory

indemnification; (b) permissive indemnification; (c) statutory non-exclusivity; and (d)

advance expenses.'""

a.

The

Model Act

first

Mandatory Indemnification

type of indemnification, mandatory indemnification,

provided

is

in

§ 8.52.

corporation shall indemnify a director

who was wholly

successful,

on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to
which he was a party because he was a director of the corporation
against reasonable expense incurred by him in connection with the
proceeding.

This Section creates a statutory right of indemnification in favor of a director
subject to the basic standard that the director has been "wholly'°^successful,

A

or otherwise" in the defense of the proceeding.'"^

successful" only if the entire proceeding
a finding of

liability.'"^

is

on the merits

defendant director

is

"wholly

disposed of on a basis which does not involve

If a defendant director has

otherwise", in such a case, the defendant director

is

been successful on "a merits or

not required to establish any of the

^"O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 9, at 373.
'"^Theodore D. Maskowitz, Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, 23 Seaton
HallL. Rev. 897, 898 (1993).
'°'The Committee on Corporate Laws, Report, Change in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Indemnification and Advance for Expenses, 49 Bus. Law. 741, 763
(1994). (The word "wholly" is added into revised provision in 1994 to avoid the argument accepted in
Merritt Chapman &. Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A. 2d 138 (Del. 1974), that a defendant may be entitled to
partial mandatory indemnification if, by plea bargaining or otherwise, he was able to obtain the dismissal
of some but not all courts of indictment.) Id.
"^Id.
'''Id
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necessary elements for permissive indemnification, which include acting in good faith

and

in a

manner reasonably believed

A
may

director

still

who

is

to

be

in the best interests

to

it

^°^

precluded from mandatory indemnification by this requirement

be entitled to permissible indemnification under section 8.51(a)^°^ or court

ordered indemnification under section 8.54

because

of the corporation.

would be unreasonable

to require a defendant with a valid procedural defense

undergo a possibly prolonged and expensive

on the merits

trial

in order to establish

mandatory indemnification.^'"

eligibility for

The Delaware law

To

The word "otherwise" has been used

(a) (3).

also provides

mandatory indemnification

the extent that a director, officer,

in section 145 (c).

employee or agent of a corporation

has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action,
suit or

proceeding referred to in subsections

any claim, issue or matter therein, he

(a)

shall

and

(b),

or in defense of

be indemnified against

expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by

him

in connection therewith.

The Delaware law

Model Act
director

in that the

who

is

relating to the

Delaware

mandatory indemnification

statute permits partial

is

distinct

from the

mandatory indemnification

for a

partially successful.^"

b.

Permissive Indemnification

In addition to mandatory indemnification, the corporation statute authorizes the

permissive indemnification at the option of a corporation.^'^

^"^BLOCK ET AL., supra note 293,

Permissive indemnification

at 564.

^"^See, infra (b).

^'°The
"'5ee,

Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 303, at 763.
e.g., Merrit v. Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A 2d 138

Westcap Corp. of Delaware, 492 A. 2d 260 (Del. Sup.
^'^Veasey, supra note 299, at 406.

Ct. 1985).

(Del. Sup. Ct. 1974);

Green

v.

:
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must be authorized on a per-case, and such authorization requires a finding
has met the standards of conduct.^

'^

The permissive indemnification
(a)

is

provided in the Model Act § 8.51

Except as otherwise provided
indemnify an individual

he

is

who

is

a party to the proceeding because

he conducted himself in good

(ii)

may

in this section, a corporation

a director against liability incurred in the proceeding

(l)(i)

that a director

faith;

if:

and

he reasonably believed:
(A)

in the case

his

of conduct in his

was

conduct

in

the

official capacity, that

best

interests

of the

corporation; and
in all other cases, that his

(B)

opposed
(iii)

in

the

case

conduct was

to the best interests

of any

not

of the corporation; and

proceeding,

criminal

at least

he

had

no

reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful; or
(2)

he engage in conduct for which broader indemnification has

been made permissible or obligatory under a provision of
the

of incorporation (as authorized by section

articles

2.02(b)(5)).
(b)

A

director's conduct with respect to an

employee benefit plan

for a

purpose he reasonably believed to be in the interests of the
participants in, and the beneficiaries of, the plan
satisfies the
(c)

is

conduct that

requirement of subsection (a)(l)(ii)(B).

The termination of a proceeding by judgment, order, settlement or
conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or it equivalent, is
not of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the
relevant standard of conduct described in this section.

(d)

Unless ordered by a court under section 8.54

may

not indemnify a director:

(1)

in connection with a

(a)(3), a corporation

proceeding by or in the right of the

corporation, except for reasonable expenses incurred in

connection with the proceeding
director has

subsection
(2)

if

it is

determined that the

met the relevant standard of conduct under

(a);

or

any proceeding with respect

in connection with

to

conduct

which he was adjudged liable on the basis that received
a financial benefit to which he was not entitled, whether or

for

not involving action in his official capacity.

''^

Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note

303, at 758.
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The standards of conduct provided
identical, to standards

for in this section are closely related, but not

of conduct imposed on directors by section

does not meet one these standards

Conduct which

8.30.'"'*

set forth in this Section is not eligible for permissible

indemnification under the Model Act, although court-ordered indemnification
available under section

8. 54(a)(3).

^'^

Conduct

that fall within the outer limits^'^

may

does not

automatically entitle the director to indemnification, although the corporation
obligate itself to indemnify the director to the

No

law.^'^

Model

such obligation, however,

is

may

extent permitted by applicable

those outer limits.^'^ According to the

not permitted for judgment or settlement

proceedings because of the underlying reason of circularity.

The Delaware
and derivative

statute provides the permissive indemnification in third party suit

That

suit separately.

and section 145
to

may exceed

Act, in derivative suit, indemnification

in derivative

maximum

be

is,

section 145 (a) provides for third-party claims;

The

(b) provides for derivative suite.

actions permitted the corporation

indemnify a director, however, are as same as in the Model Act.
§ 145(a)

or

is

A corporation shall have power to
a party or

threatened to be

is

pending or completed action,

suit

who was

indemnify any person

made

a party to any threatened,

and proceeding, whether

by or

criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an action

the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he
director, officer,

serving

the

at

request

trust or other enterprise, against

judgments,

fines

and

is

of the corporation as a director,

employee or agent of another corporation, partnership,
expenses

amounts

paid

I

in

in

was a
or was

or

is

employee or agent of the corporation, or

civil,

officer,

joint venture,

including attorneys' fees),
settlement

actually

and

reasonably incurred by him in connection with such action, suit or

proceeding

^'"/(i.

(A

terms of

director

if

who meets

he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably

all

three standards of conduct set forth in § 8.30

would have no

liability

under

§ 8.30 (d)). Id.

^'Hd. at 757.

been expanded to include the broader limits of charter provision adopted pursuant to §
which permits a corporation to authorize or require indemnification for directors so long as

''^This section has

2.02 (b)
their

(5),

conduct does not

fall

within one of four exceptions based on the

charter provision under section 2.02 (b) (4). Id. at 743.

^'^MODEL Bus. Corp. Act
'''Id.

§ 8.58(a);

Del.

Code Ann.

§ 2.02 (b) (4).

same exceptions

for liability-limiting
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believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,

with respect to any criminal

and,

action

or proceeding,

had no

reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination

of any action,

suit

or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement,

conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or

of

not,

itself,

and

faith

opposed

equivalent, shall

its

create a presumption that the person did not act in

a manner which he reasonably believed

in

to the best interests

to

good

be in or not

of the corporation, and, with respect to

any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that
his conduct
(b)

A

was unlawful,

corporation

threatened to

may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is
be made a party to any threatened, pending or complete

action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to procure a

judgment
officer,

by reason of the

was a director,
was serving at
employee or agent

he

is

or

employee, or agent of the corporation, or

is

or

in its favor

fact that

the request of the corporation as a director, officer,

of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
enterprise against expenses (including attorneys'

reasonably

incurred

by him

settlement of such action or suit

if

with

connection

in

trust

or

other

and

actually

fee)

the

defense

or

he acted in good faith and in maimer

he believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation and except that no indemnification shall be
respect of any claim, issue or matter as to

been adjudged

to

which such person

was brought

shall

is

which such action or

determine upon application

adjudication of liability but in view of
case, such person

in

have

be liable to the corporation unless and only to the

extent that the Court of Chancery or the court in
suit

made
shall

fairly

all

that, despite the

the circumstances of the

and reasonably entitled

to

indemnify for

such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other court shall

deem

proper.

Unlike the Model Act, the Delaware statute authorizes indemnification in a
derivative suit, but only for the expenses (including attorney's fee) incurred in such
derivative

suit.^''

'"Block et al., supra

note 293, at 571

& n.40 (In

1986, a proposal to revise § 145 (b) to permit

indemnification in derivative suits of judgment and amounts paid in settlement

Corporation

Law

Section of the Delaware Bar Association. However,

in derivative suit, for

example,

New York, New Jersey,

Pennsylvania.

some
)

Id.

was denied by

the General

states permits indemnification
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c.

Statutory Non-Exclusivity

Statutory non-exclusivity

own programs

a provision that permits a corporation to formulate

is

for indemnification

provides statute non-exclusivity in

statute. "°

beyond the limitation of the

The Model Act

§ 8.58.^^'

A Variation by Corporate Action; Application of Subchapter
(a) A corporation may, by a provision in its articles of incorporation
bylaws or

in resolution

adopted or a contract approved by

its

or

board of

directors or shareholders,

obligate itself in advance of the act or

omission giving

proceeding to provide indemnification

rise to a

in

accordance with section 8.51 or advance funds to pay for or reimburse

Any

expenses in accordance with section 8.53.
provision shall

such obligatory

be deemed to satisfy the requirements for authorization

Any

referred to in section 8.53 (c) and in section 8.55 (c).

such

provision that obligates the corporation to provide indemnification to
the

fiillest

extent permitted by law shall be

deemed

to obligate the

corporation to advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses in

permitted by law,

fullest extent

accordance with section 8.53 to the

unless the provision specifically provides otherwise.
(b)

Any

provision

pursuant to

subsection

(a)

not obligate the

shall

corporation to indemnify or advance expenses to a director of a

predecessor of the corporation, pertaining to conduct with respect to
the predecessor, unless otherwise specifically provided.
for

indemnification

or

advance

expenses

for

in

Any

the

provision

articles

of

incorporation, bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors of

shareholders of a predecessor of the corporation in a merger or in a
contract to

which the predecessor

merger takes
(c)

effect, shall

A corporation may, by
any of the rights

a party, existing at the time the

is

be governed by section

a provision in

its

to indemnification or

articles

1

1.06 (a)(3).

of incorporation, limit

advance for expenses created by

or pursuant to this subchapter.
(d) This

subchapter does not limit a corporation's power to pay or

reimburse expenses incurred by a director or an officer in connection

with his appearance as a witness in a proceeding

at

a time

when he

is

not a party.

"°Knepper& Bailey, supra note 296, § 20.12, at 669.
"'This Section is a new section which has been revised
1994.

in the

its

Revised Model Business Corporation Act
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This subchapter does not Hmit a corporation's power to indemnify,

(e)

advance expenses

employee or

This

new

to or provide or

maintain insurance on behalf of an

agent.

section authorizes obligation indemnification and expense

advancement

provisions in the articles of incorporation or by-laws and elsewhere so long as these

provisions are approved by the shareholders or board of directors."'" However, the
corporation's rights to provide indemnification have been restricted to the extent that

permitted by subsection

The

F.^^^

statutory non-exclusivity provided in the

exclusivity provisions

which has been used

as a

distinction of statutory non-exclusivity under

Delaware law

model

for

Delaware

many

statute

statute provides for non-exclusivity indemnification without

exclusivity

is

provided in

§

145

is

deemed

""^

non-

The

that the

Delaware

restrictions.

The non-

(f).

The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided
granted pursuant

first

state statutes.

is

any

one of the

by, or

to, the other subsections of this section shall not be

exclusive

of

any

other

rights

to

which

those

seeking

indemnification or advancement, vote of stockholders or disinterested
directors or otherwise, both as to action in his official capacity

and as

to

action in another capacity while holding such office.

d.

Advance Expenses

Indemnification statutes generally provide for advance payment for fees and

expense before the
in

final adjudication

1994 provides advance expenses
(a)

A

of the

litigation as well.^^^

The Model Act revised

in § 8.53.

corporation may, before final disposition of a proceeding; advance

funds to pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a
"^The Committee of Corporate Laws, supra note 303,

"^MODEL Bus. Corp. Act

§ 8.59.

^^"Block ET al., supra note 293, at 617.
"^Knepper& Bailey, supra note 296, § 20.12,

at

667.

at

747.
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directors

who

is

a party to a proceeding because he

is

a director if he

delivers to the corporation:
(1) a written affirmation

of his good

faith

behef that he has met the

relevant standard of conduct described in section 8.51 or that
the proceeding involves conduct for

which

liability

has been

eliminated by a provision of the articles of incorporation as

authorized by section 2.02(b)(4); and
(2) his written undertaking to repay

entitled to
is

any funds advanced

if

he

not

is

mandatory indemnification under section 8.52 and

it

ultimately determined under section 8.54 or section 8.55 that

he has not met the relevant standard of conduct described

in

section 8.51.

(b)The undertaking required by subsection (a)(2) must be an unlimited
general obligation of the director but need not be secured and

may

be

accepted without reference to the financial ability of the director to

make repayment.
(c)

Authorizations under this section shall be made:
(1)

by the board of directors:
(i)

if there are

majority

two or more

vote

majority of

of

whom

all

disinterested directors,

the

disinterested

shall for

by a

directors

(a

such purpose constitute a

quorum) or by a majority of the members of a
committee of two or more disinterested directors
appointed by such a vote; or
(ii) if

there are fewer that

two

disinterested directors,

by the

vote necessary for action by the board in accordance

with section 8.24(c), in which authorization directors

who do

not

qualify

as

disinterested

any

directors

participate; or
(2)

by the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the
control of a director
disinterested director

who at the time does
may not be voted on the

not qualify as a
authorization.

In addition to a written affirmation required in former statute, this

requires a "Written Undertaking" to repay an advance for expenses

by the director

326-

involved.^^^

The Committee of Corporate Laws, supra note

303, at 745.

new

section

which must be made
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On

the other hand, the advance expenses provision of the

Delaware

statute

permits the corporation to allow advance payment without any conditions provided by
law.

The Delaware law

145 (e) provides:

§

Expenses (including attorneys'

by an officer or director

fees) incurred

in

defending civil, criminal, administrative or investigative action, suit or

proceeding

may

of such action,

be paid by the corporation

in

advance of

final disposition

proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on

suit or

behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount

be determined that he

is

if

it

shall ultimately

not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation

Such expenses incurred (including attorneys'
by other employees and agents may be so paid upon such terms and
conditions, if any, as the board of directors deems appropriate.
as authorized in this section.
fees)

As provided

in this subsection the

payment upon shareholder approval.
standard of conduct and

if the

Delaware

statute

does not require advance

Therefore, if a director meets the appropriate

decision to provide advance

procedures specified for permissive indemnification,''^^ the director

payment.

Moreover, the Delaware

statute permits

payment follows
is

entitled to

the

advance

advancement of expenses on a non-

exclusive basis.^^^

2.

Statutory Limitation on Liability

The second approach

that

US

corporation law employs to provide a director in a

close corporation with protection from liability
Traditionally, corporations protected directors

and purchasing the

liability insurance.

"'Maskowitz, supra note 302, at 91 1.
"'Del. Code ANN. § 145(f).
"'O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note
330

488 A. 2d, 858

(Del. Sup. 1985).

9, at

Around
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is

a statutory limitation on liability.

by indemnifying them against
the time Smith

v.

liability^^^

Van Gorkunv'^^ case was
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argued and decided, the cost of

became unavailable

to a

Legislatures

in

insurance has increased dramatically and has

number of previously covered

corporations.^^'

Delaware and many other

states

perceived crisis by authorizing a

A

liability

new mechanism

quickly responded

for protecting a director

from

to

this

liability.

limitation or elimination of directors' liability for negligent acts can be effected

by

inserting an appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation.^^^

As

to the statutory limitation

The

of incorporation

articles

on

liability the

may

Model Act

§ 2.02 (b)(4) provides:

set forth:

(4) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability

the corporation or

its

shareholders for

money damages

of a director to
for

any action

taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for

(A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he

is

not entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the
(C) a violation of section 8.33;

shareholders;

or

(D) an intentional

violation of criminal law.

This Section authorizes a corporation to include a provision in the articles of
incorporation eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or

shareholders

for

money damages.

This

is

called

the

charter

Nevertheless, this option contains four exceptions where a corporation

such a provision in

its articles

The Delaware
than thirty

states."'*

1

may

statute."^

not include

of incorporation.

limitation

Section

option

02

on

liability

(b) (7)

provision has served as a model for

more

of Delaware law contains the following content.

(b) In addition to the matters required to

be

set forth in the certificate

of

incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of

incorporation

"'O'Kelley

may

its

also contain any or all of the following matters:

& Thompson, supra note 9, at 370.

"^The Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of Directors, 45 Bus. Law. 695, 696 (1990).
""Knepper & Bailey, supra note 296, § 7.04 at 215.
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(7)

A

provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a

director to the corporation or

damages
that

for breach

its

such provision shall not eliminate or limit the

director:

(i)

stockholders;

its

in good
knowing

which involve

any

liability

faith or

violation of law;

transaction

for acts or omissions not

intentional

when such

misconduct or a

§ 174 of

which the

No

this title; or (iv)

derived

director

any act or omission occurring

provision becomes effective. All

references in this paragraph to a director shall also be
to refer (x) to a
is

an

such provision shall eliminate or

limit the liability of director for

prior to the date

(ii)

under

(iii)

from

improper personal benefit.

which

of a

For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to

the corporation or

for

stockholders for monetary

of fiduciary duty as a director, provided

member of the governing body of a

deemed

corporation

not authorized to issue capital stock, and (y) to such

other person or persons, if any,

who

pursuant to a provision of

the certificate of incorporation in accordance with § 141 (a) of
this title,

exercise or perform any of the powers or duties

otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by
this title.

Like the Model Act, the Delaware statute only covers damage
directors.

liability

of

Neither equitable remedies nor damage suits against directors are limited by

the applicable statute."^

Moreover, the charter option of the Delaware statute

is

unclear

because one subsection provides one exception by using the phrase "duty of loyalty"

which does not appear
so far as

is

3.

know,

in

any other provisions

in

in the business corporation act

Delaware General Corporation Act, or

of other states."^

Liability Insurance

The

last

approach provided by the corporation law in the

Corporations including a close corporation

may

"^O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 9, at 398.
"*The Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 33 1

,

US

is liability

insurance.

purchase and maintain on behalf of an

at

696.
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who

individual

is

a director insurance against liability asserted against or incurred by him

in that capacity or arising

would have power

from his

status as a director

whether or not the corporations

indemnify or advance expenses to him against the same

to

under the Model Act."^ This right of the corporations

is

liability

recognized by the Model Act

§

8.57.

A

may

corporation

individual

who

is

purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of an

a director or officer of the corporation, or who, while a

director or officer of the corporation, serves at the corporation's request as

a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another domestic
or foreign corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit
plan, or other entity, against liability asserted against or incurred

from his

that capacity or arising

status as a director or officer,

by him

in

whether or

not the corporation would have power to indemnify or advance expenses
to

him

The

against the

liability

same

insurance

liability

is

under

this subchapter.

usually referred to as

"D&O

liability

insurance""*

Delaware Statute also provides a provision authorizing a corporation
liability

insurance for

g)

A

its

to

The

purchase the

directors in § 145 (g).

corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on

behalf of any person

who

agent of the corporation, or
corporation as a director,

or

is

is

was a director,
or was serving

officer,

officer,
at the

employee or

request of the

employee or agent of another

corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against

any

liability asserted against

him and incurred by him

in

any such

capacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the

corporation would have the power to indemnify
liability

under the provisions of this

him

against such

section....

"7c?. at 779.

"^O'Kelley

&

Thompson, supra

note 9, at 400. Currently available insurance have been developed a

variety of different form differ from the original insurance.

The

first

insurance policies having two parts

designed to protect directors and officers from unwarranted apprehension of

liability.

Part one

was

called

"Corporate Reimbursement Liability". Part two was termed "Directors and Officer Liability" and named
officers

and directors against insurable

acts. Id. at

383.
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This approach, however,

hardly appHcable for a close corporation because a

is

close corporation has always had difficulty obtaining

American Law

Institute has

analyzed

The more

As

insurance"."^

the

that:

"In the case of small companies,

coverage.

"D&O

is

it

often difficult to obtain

closely controlled the harder

it

is.

Underwriters arc

few people can effectively
someone saying, "we will do it
Then after a few of these occasions, a

afraid of closely held corporations, because a

They

dominate the company.
because

I

say

we

will

do

anticipate

it".

minority stockholder sues in a derivative action for the benefit of the

company. All the underwriter can see are problems. The more centralized
"^"^
the control in the company, the more difficult it is to get coverage.

Furthermore, although
liability

because the cost of

many

state

liability

statutes

utilize

the

statutory

on

limitation

insurance has increased dramatically, liability

insurance continues to be unavailable to numerous corporations.^'"

C.

Protective Measures and Devices under Thai Limited

Company Law

Unlike the corporation statutes in the US, the Commercial Code in Thailand does
not explicitly provide for indemnification, limitation on liability, and even liability

insurance provisions to authorize a limited

company

to protect its directors. This

means

"'O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 9, at 400.
"°The American Law Institute, ALI-ABA Course of study on Insuring Corporate Personnel
AND Professional Advisers Under Expanding Concepts of Responsibility, at 5 (1970).
'"Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Crisis, 39 Emory L.J. 1155, 1161
1

(1990).

(D&O

insurers did not respond to the enactment of limited liability statutes

although the vast majority of corporations that have the opportunity to opt for these

There are

at least

not exempt from

two plausible explanations
liability

for the stickiness in rates.

by lowering premiums,

new regimes

First, the statutes in

most

did so.
states

do

claim for breach of the duty of loyalty, violation of federal securities laws, and

breach of the duty of care by directors

who

are also officers.

Since class actions alleging federal securities

violations tend to generate larger recoveries than derivative suits, the case the statutes eliminated from
liability

tend to cost insurers

certain duty

more

less.

Of course, some of the

claims not eliminated by the statutes, including

of loyalty claims, are not covered by the typical insurance policy

either.

Second, and perhaps

important, the statutes' effectiveness will be careftil to bring their complaints within the included

liability categories

and will allege recklessness or

willfiil

misconduct rather than negligence.)

Id.
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Hmited company

that a director in the

provided by law like a director

in

Thailand docs not have protective devices

in a close corporation

measures and devices can a director protect himself from

As

described in Chapter

shareholders.^''^

II,

a limited

company

is

in

What

US.

the

liability arising

out of his duty?

created by an agreement between

company

Similarly, the relationship between a director and a limited

created by contract as well.

disputes and propositions

It is

may

clear that under Thai

be constrained by

the liability of the director in a limited

company

protective

law almost

contract.^''^

all

This

is

as provided in the

is

of the intra-company
also true in event of

Commercial Code

§

1170.

When
meeting,

the acts of a director have been approved by a general

such director

is

no longer

liable

for

the

said

acts

who have approved them, or to the company.
Shareholders who did not approve of such acts cannot

the

to

shareholders

action later than six

months

after the date

enter their

of the general meeting

in

which

such acts were approved.

This Section
liability

the only one provision dealing with the exculpation of director

under the Commercial Code. Unlike, the corporation law in the US, the director

in a limited

creditors.^'"'

its

is

directors

company

in Thailand shall

be liable to the company, shareholders, and

Notwithstanding, the Commercial Code authorizes a

company

by the resolution of the meeting of shareholders.^"^ By

director can be discharged only for liability to the

this

to discharge

approach a

company and shareholders who voted

approval acts done by the director. Therefore, the director remains liable to shareholders

who

did not vote for approval as well as to creditors.

^''^See

supra text accompanying note 79-82.

^'^Traditionally, as log as the dispute or proposition arising out

^"^

This Section

of the intra-company

may

Commercial Code

§

1

similar to

finally be

resolved through the resolution of meeting of shareholders.

^'^The

is

169.

"^The general resolution of meeting of shareholders requires majority vote of shareholders.
'"^The Commercial Code § 1 169 ^ II and 1 170.
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statutory indemnification under the

US

corporation law, but the impact of this Section

cannot really be compared to the statutory indemnification

Another approach
of his duty

is to

that a director

company

to

do

so,

company

by contract law
e.g. violation

in

in

any

is

to

limit director liability in

its

out

articles

no provision authorizing a limited

indemnify or limit the

acts.

The freedom

liability

to contract

Thailand as long as the contract

is

of

its

director

who

concept has been recognized

not contrary to the public policy,

of criminal law, or harm other persons or being contrary to public norms.

In Thailand, like in the

company, so

Although there

liability arising

under freedom to contract concepts, the director, a limited company

and shareholders may agree
represents the

US.

can use to protect himself for

have a limited company eliminate or

of incorporation or by contract.

in the

it

is

US,

D&O

liability

hard for a director to use a

insurance

liability

not available for a limited

is

insurance approach to protect

himself like that of the director in a close corporation in the US.
In conclusion, according to Thai limited
less protective

company laws

measures and devices available for a director

those of a director in a close corporation in the US.

Code seems

to protect the minority shareholders

rather than directors.

Id. §

1170.

On

it

appears that there are

in a limited

company than

the other hand, the

Commercial

and creditors of the limited company^"*^

.

CONCLUSION

VI.

Under

traditional corporation

law doctrine, undoubtedly a director of a close

corporation or a limited company, owes a fiduciary duty of care as well as a duty of
loyalty to the corporation and
to

manage

the

corporation

its

shareholders.'"*

for

the

As

exclusive

a result, a director

benefit

of his

is

legally required

corporation

and

its

shareholders.'"'

In the

US

the legislatures and courts recognize the special characteristics of a

close corporation which are distinct from a publicly held corporation.'^"

number of

states

Even though a

have passed special statutes regarding close corporations or have

enacted special sections in their general corporation laws that deal with the

common

law

problems of a close corporation."' The provisions with regard to the director's fiduciary

on

duty, statutory indemnification, statute limitation

liability,

and

liability

insurance are

applied to both close corporations and publicly held corporations.^"

Obviously, the corporation laws in the

US

have been designed and developed to

regulate the publicly held corporations,'" including the director's fiduciary duty, statutory

'"^Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium: Corporate Malaise-Stockholder Statute: Cause or Cure?;

An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationals for Making Shareholders the Economic
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Steton

L.

Rev. 23, 23 (1991).

'"'Mercey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investment,

Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J.
owed

exclusively to shareholders

is

derived for the

and the Legal Treatment of

173, 175 (1989). (The fiduciary duty should be

modem

financial theory that shareholders retain the

ultimate authority to control the corporation because they have the greatest stake in the

corporate decision-making

""Robert

B.

outcome of the

).

Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts

in

a Corporation,

15

J.

Corp.

L.

377,394

(1990).

'^'Rodman Elfin, A Critique of the Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the
Model Business Corporation Act, 8 J. Corp. L. 439, 441 (1990).
'"5ee Model Bus. Corp. Act; Del. Code Ann.
'"Elfin, supra note 349,

at

441
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indemnification, statutory limitation on liability, and liability insurance.

However, some

of these provisions are not practically applied to a close corporation for the following
reasons:
1.

The provisions regarding

conflict of interest transactions a

corporation

processes

transaction

not

are

corporation

is

number of processes

regarding

practical

in

the fiduciary duty of loyalty.

a

public

a close

For example,

in

are available to validate a public

corporation,

corporation

however,

because,

these

validation

traditionally,

a

close

permitted to opt-out of the usual corporate formalities,"" or operate under

These special characteristics of a

the direction of shareholders instead of directors."'

close corporation cause the fiduciary duty of a director in a close corporation to

seem

meaningless, except for being imposed to directly protect the minority shareholders in a
close corporation."''

Therefore,

director are better addressed
2.

limitation

The
on

corporation.^^^

by

some propositions

contract.

protective measures and devices,

and

liability,

relevant to the fiduciary duty of a

liability

The major purpose of

i.e.

statutory indemnification, statute

insurance, appear to be inapplicable to a close
statutory indemnification

is

to

encourage outside

directors to serve as directors of a corporation.^^* This rarely occurs in a close corporation

because in a close corporation a majority shareholder traditionally serves as director and
the

management

in the

corporation.^^^

Therefore, indemnification has mainly been

designed to authorize the corporation to indemnify the outside director in a publicly held
corporation/^" but not a close corporation.

""Model Bus. Corp. Act
"'Model Bus. Corp. Act
"*Macey, supra note 346,

§ 25;

Del.

§ 21; Del.
at

Code Ann.
Code Ann.

26-28.

"'5ee supra text accompanying note 292-339.
"*5ee supra text accompanying note 299-326.
"'5ee supra text accompanying note 41-42.
^^See supra text accompanying note 292-297.

§ 354.
§ 351.
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limitations

Liability

the

for

context are best achieved

close corporation

by

contract because the limitation on liability of director will never affect the rights of
the shareholder and the director.^*^'

persons other than

Thus, the provision to permit a

close corporation to provide for limitation on liability in the articles of corporation seems
to

be appropriate.
Furthermore, the availability of

assets that

may

appropriate for

liability

all

be needed in the business.

insurance prevents resort to corporate

Hence, the

liability

insurance seems

corporations, but the liability insurance provision seems inapplicable

to close corporations^^^

because

liability

insurance

is

not generally available to close

corporations.

In contrast, a limited

company

operate with the family-owned
in the

in

company

Thailand has been designed and developed to
or (private) limited company.^"

Commercial Code has been designed and developed

family-owned company based upon freedom

to contract.

All provisions

for a limited

The provisions

company

or

in regard to the

fiduciary duty of director as well as protective measures and devices provided for a
director in a limited

company

are merely a set of standard-form provisions to facilitate the

process of private ordering,^^'' thus the intra-company parties are free to shape their
contractual arrangement as long as

it

does not affect third-party rights or

is

own

not contrary to

public policy or norms in Thailand.^"

'*'MODEL Bus. Corp. Act § 2.02 (b) (4); Del. Code Ann. § 102 (b)(7).
^^^See supra text accompanying note 327-334.
^"Not until 1974, THE COMMERCIAL Code imposes to all types of companies, a limited (private) company
and a public limited company. After the first Public Limited Company Act was promulgated in 1974, THE
Commercial Code has been revised to afford the new type of company by restricting the rights of limited
company, for example, public offering, issue debenture bond. However, the dominance of limited
companies has continued to influence to business investment environment in Thailand which it frustrates
the development in public limited company.
^^The Commercial Code § 1 1 70.
'*'This propositions are left for the court to decide what contractual arrangement affects third-party rights
or

is

contrary to public policy.

81

However, the provisions
protect

minority

in

the

Commercial Code

shareholders,'^ rather than

directors

directors and majority shareholders traditionally are the

control the
to

because,

Courts in the

US

fact, in light

shareholders and [director],

need of additional
close corporation.

it

company, need

As one commentator

of the pervasive conflicts of interest that exists between

seems

legal protection

clear that if

it is

any group within the [corporation]

the shareholders."^^* This

is

is in

especially true for the

Therefore, the provisions related to fiduciary duty of directors and

company

the small business entities, like a close corporation in the

^^^See

above,

also have recognized that in a close

protective measures and devices provided for limited

^**The

described

in a limited

corporation the minority shareholder should be protected by laws.

has pointed out, "in

as

same persons which manage and

company. Conversely, the minority shareholders

be protected by the laws.^^'

are obviously designed to

Commercial Code

§ 11 70.

supra text accompanying note 340-345.

"*Macey, supra note 347,

at 44.

US.

in Thailand better serve
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